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ABSTRACT 
A disaster with mass casualties or event involving a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) 
is a profound, life-impacting event that can lead to further devastating consequences. 
Under austere conditions, however, the implementation of altered standards of care can 
greatly increase the quality of life of individuals injured by such an event. This thesis 
evaluates, compares, and contrasts, at the various federal, state, and local levels, guidance 
documents for altered standards of care and presents a policy recommendation for the 
inclusion of triggers, guaranteed minimums of care, and legal immunity into existing 
planning guidance documents for altered standards of care at the federal, state, and local 
levels. In formulating this policy recommendation, consideration was given to ethical 
values that should be used to develop policies for altered standards of care, which are 
recommended to guide and support decision making during both preparation and 
response at different levels of government. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The standard-of-care framework that currently guides healthcare in the United 
States assumes that each presenting patient, regardless of precipitating event, will receive 
care and attention that will not be diverted to the next patient until care for the first 
patient is underway or until that patient is transferred or referred. Additionally, the 
current framework relies on a high level of technology that may not be achievable after a 
disaster or WMD event if there are electrical outages, destroyed buildings, or extremely 
limited numbers of healthcare workers available and willing to work. For those who 
would work under such circumstances, the fear of potential legal action is not unfounded, 
given the charges filed against nurses and Dr. Anna Maria Pou for failure to care and 
inappropriate use of medication in New Orleans following the flooding associated with 
hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Okie, 2008, p. 4). Pou and two nurses were arrested in July 
2006 and accused of administering lethal doses of medications to four older adult 
patients, thereby intentionally killing them. Dr. Pou has asserted that the medications 
were given only to relieve pain and distress. The attorney general in Louisiana did not 
pursue charges against the nurses in exchange for their cooperation, and the grand jury 
ultimately did not indict Dr. Pou. However, three civil suits, filed by the deceased 
patients’ relatives, are pending against Pou (Okie, 2008, p. 5).  
Given circumstances similar to those described above, altered standards of care in 
mass-casualty events have been shown to optimize patient outcomes (Koenig, 2006, 
p. 196). Altered standards of care would be enacted during a pandemic influenza, 
bioterrorist attack, or natural disaster in which healthcare providers would have to triage 
victims in order to apportion limited equipment, supplies, personnel, and medication in a 
manner that saves the greatest number of lives. There are, however, planning and legal 




hospital staff and others that they will be held responsible for actions taken that were, in 
fact, the best decision that could be made under such extreme conditions (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2008; Hodge, 2006, p. 627).  
1.  Background 
The threat of a catastrophic mass-casualty incident resulting in tens of thousands 
of victims related to a public health event—such as an influenza pandemic, or a terrorist 
event such as the detonation of an improvised nuclear device—is internationally accepted 
(Hawryluck, Lapinsky, and Stewart, 2005, p. 384). It is also internationally accepted that 
most countries do not necessarily have sufficient healthcare staff, equipment, and 
physical space to provide urgent care to those critically injured by such dire events 
(Institute of Medicine [IOM], 2006). 
Disaster events with the potential for mass casualties occur on a frequent basis 
worldwide (International Disaster Database, 2010). Luckily, the overwhelming majority 
of these events do not produce extremely large numbers of victims that are critically 
injured. International planning efforts for mass critical care have been motivated by 
recent natural disasters, terrorist attacks, the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) 
epidemic of 2002–2003 (Christain, Poutanen, and Loutfy, 2004, p. 1420), and the 
continued threat of the serious H1N1 influenza. While the current H1N1 influenza 
appears to be relatively less dangerous and fatal compared to other pandemics, it is 
important to understand that during the twentieth century alone there have been three 
recognized influenza pandemics–in 1918, 1957, and 1968–each causing an estimated 50 
million deaths worldwide (Health Protection Agency [HPA], 2010).  
2. Disasters and the Healthcare Sector 
Disasters are becoming more frequent and more severe, and the capabilities of the 
medical sector are increasingly being pushed to the limit. Every disaster brings new 
challenges; a few disasters have created what seem to be problematic challenges, like the 
2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes (Bower, 2005). There are cases of floods, hurricanes, 
earthquakes, and other physical hazards creating both an increased need for healthcare 
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services and a significant loss of capability to provide such services. On occasion, 
hospitals and emergency medical services (EMS) fall victim to these events at a time 
when they are expected to demonstrate leadership and provide help to the impacted 
population (American College of Emergency Physicians [ACEP], 2006).  
Physical hazards alone are not enough to cause a disaster. Disasters result when 
vulnerable populations and infrastructure are exposed to these physical hazards. It is this 
exposure that results in destruction, injures, and deaths. In turn, these outcomes reflect 
both the magnitude of the hazards and the level of vulnerability of the infrastructure and 
population (Shoaf et al., 2006). Although vulnerability is a difficult concept to directly 
measure, it is generally accepted that more vulnerable populations experience the worst 
impact from disaster events. There are a number of economic, social, and demographic 
variables that are linked to a population’s vulnerability to disasters, including 
characteristics such as age and income level (Spedale, 2006).  
The vulnerability of the medical community to disasters must be an important 
consideration for all involved in health care. First, the medical community centers around 
one of the most vulnerable segments of the population: patients. People seek medical care 
for different reasons, including chronic conditions, diseases, and injuries—nearly all of 
which can potentially impact the patient’s physical ability to confront the challenges 
present during a disaster. Paradoxically, while the medical facility often provides safe 
refuge to shield patients’ exposure to disasters, the unique vulnerability of these same 
facilities also threatens patients, healthcare providers, and their respective families 
following a disaster (Shoaf et al., 2006). 
The second source of vulnerability for the healthcare community reflects the 
dependence of the medical system on outside resources. A fully functioning hospital 
consumes large amounts of energy; requires daily deliveries of medicine, food, and other 
supplies; and depends on a highly skilled and specialized workforce (Shoaf et al., 2006). 
In today’s world, most hospitals also depend on high bandwidth telecommunications 
systems for a variety of lifesaving functions. During disasters some or all of these vital 
outside resources are disrupted, limiting the ability of the facility to function. 
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Finally, when discussing the vulnerability of the medical community, it is 
essential to consider the effects of a disaster on the people who work in health care, both 
at the provider and the responder levels. Often, when medical personnel must work 
through a disaster, they are very preoccupied with the safety of their homes, possessions, 
and loved ones. It is not unusual for doctors, nurses, administrators and first-responder 
personnel to face a basic conflict between their professional and their personal 
obligations during a disaster. Clearly, the personal stresses experienced by nurses, 
doctors, and other personnel during times of crisis create an additional vulnerability for 
the delivery of healthcare to the community (Van der Vink et al., 1998). 
Disasters are complex processes with complex consequences. Because of this 
inherent complexity, analyzing disasters is difficult. Effective disaster planning, which 
requires a thorough analysis of hazards and vulnerability, is even more difficult. 
Thorough disaster planning requires the consideration of numerous hazards and the 
potential impact of the threat they pose to different populations and various types of 
infrastructures. Additional complications can result from the high degree of uncertainty, 
both in predicting the occurrence of an event and in estimating the consequences of that 
event. 
3. Disaster Types and Their Impact 
Disasters occur when vulnerable people and infrastructure are exposed to some 
type of physical hazard. Many types of hazards exist, and each type has certain associated 
impacts on citizens and on the healthcare system. These hazards include floods, 
earthquakes, hurricanes, and associated mass-casualty incidents. In general terms, floods 
are the most frequent disasters and are responsible for the greatest accumulated damage. 
Earthquakes tend to produce the most destructive and deadly events (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency [FEMA], 2009). 
Floods are generally described as the presence of an accumulation of water in an 
otherwise dry location. They are the most common type of natural disaster. During 2008, 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) responded to 52 flood-related 
disaster declarations, approximately one every week (FEMA, 2009). Because floods are 
 5
so common, they are also responsible for the greatest loss in total when compared to 
other disaster types. A variety of processes causes the accumulation of water in an 
otherwise dry area, leading to varying types of flood events. The four main types of 
flooding are 1) coastal flooding, 2) river flooding, 3) dam breaks, and 4) floods resulting 
from poor urban area drainage (Center for Public Health and Disasters [CPHD], 2006). 
Additionally, flooding conditions can vary along a wide variety of physical 
characteristics. Naturally, water depth is an important physical characteristic of the flood, 
but the rate-of-rise, the flow velocity, the height of waves, the temperature of the water, 
and the duration of inundation all influence the severity of the flooding disaster.  
The most obvious and direct impact of floods is the inundation of communities 
and structures. Such inundation causes damage to structures and creates a drowning risk 
for those exposed to flood waters (CPHD, 2006). Persons exposed to cold-temperature 
flood waters also face a significant risk of developing hypothermia. In addition to 
inundation, floods cause structural damage when the waters are either fast moving or 
have significant wave action. Damaged structures then become water-borne debris, which 
can cause a significant number of injuries and deaths. 
Although not as common as floods, several of the most severe disasters are the 
result of earthquakes. This fact reflects the extensive structural damage that earthquakes 
typically cause. Within a matter of a few seconds, an earthquake can level thousands of 
buildings, including hospitals. In describing the 1971 San Fernando Valley Earthquake, 
two nurses said, “The earth shrugged, and 1,700 hospital beds were lost in 52 seconds” 
(Braverman and Jenks, 1971). Earthquakes occur when tectonic energy is suddenly 
released, resulting in seismic waves that cause shaking and displacement on the surface. 
The sudden release of stored energy results in ground shaking, surface faulting, and/or 
ground failures. Most earthquakes result in little or no damage, but they are potentially 
the most dangerous of all natural hazards. Over the past few years, several earthquakes 
have been large enough to be felt in the western portion of the state of Tennessee, which 
lies within the New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ). 
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The NMSZ is a 150-mile-long fault that runs through southeast Missouri, 
northeast Arkansas, and most of western Tennessee (see figure 1). Historic earthquakes in 
the region, such as the 1811–1812 earthquakes, are believed to have had magnitudes of 
approximately 8.0 or greater. Since the central United States geology is susceptible to soil 
liquefaction, earthquake damage is magnified over a potentially wider area. Within 
Tennessee, there are 2,757,823 people residing in the 37 critical counties of the NMSZ. 
Of these, 911,438 reside in the Memphis/Shelby county area. There are 1,846,385 other 
Tennessee citizens who reside in one of the other 36 critical counties. In total, there are 
approximately 44 million people living within the NMSZ (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008). 
 
Figure 1.   New Madrid Seismic Zone (from CUSEC, 2005) 
In August 2005 the Central United States Earthquake Consortium (CUSEC), 
FEMA, and the United States Geological Survey (USGS) created an NMSZ scenario for 
planning purposes that encompassed the entire seismic zone. This scenario was based on 
the historic earthquake series of 1811–1812 that devastated the region and used a 
magnitude 7.7 as the base magnitude for planning. Based on the NMSZ modeling, 
Tennessee will sustain the following impact: 
• 33,000 injured; 
• 7,000 seriously injured and in need of advanced medical/surgical care; 
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• 3,000 deaths; 
• 342,000 in shelters; 
• 2.1 million without food, water, ice; 
• 115, 589 structures totally destroyed; 
• 88,219 structures with major damage; 
• 900 damaged bridges with 330 bridge collapses; 
• 404 schools collapsed and rendered unusable for shelters; 
• 48 hospitals severely damaged and inoperable for at least 3 days. 
By comparison, the 1994 Northridge earthquake in Southern California measured 
6.7 on the seismograph (see figure 2). During the Northridge quake, there were a total of 
57 earthquake-related fatalities, and 1,500 people were seriously injured. Although the 
time of the earthquake was significant in reducing the number of fatalities and injuries, it 
should be noted that the newer building stock played a significant role in this low injury 
and fatality rate, as many of these buildings were built with earthquake safety in mind 
(Southern California Earthquake Data Center [SCEDC], 2010). Unlike California, most 
of the building stock in the NMSZ of Tennessee was built without mitigating the impacts 
of a catastrophic earthquake (CUSEC, 2005).  
 
Figure 2.   Damage Area of the 1994 Northridge Earthquake in Comparison to the 1895 
New Madrid Earthquake (from CUSEC, 2005) 
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4. Disasters’ Effect on Health Care 
Regardless of the type of disaster, the impact felt by the healthcare community 
can be summarized in four basic areas: 1) physical destruction of facilities, 2) loss of 
crucial facilities, 3) surge of injured needing medical care, and 4) loss of personnel. 
Floods and earthquakes are capable of causing considerable damage to healthcare 
facilities (Arendt and Hess, 2008). Floods can inundate lower levels, destroying any 
equipment, including data and supply centers that may be located on flooded lower-level 
floors. Earthquakes can cause sections of buildings or even the entire building to 
collapse. 
When facilities and equipment sustain damage, the capacities and capabilities of 
the healthcare system become completely compromised. Certain procedures that require 
specialized equipment are not possible if that equipment is rendered inoperable. Making 
the situation even worse, damaged facilities sometimes must be totally evacuated. In rare 
occasions, the destruction of a facility has meant that medical care must be delivered in 
temporary (mobile) applications set up in parking lots or any available building of 
opportunity (ACEP, 2006). In addition to the destruction of buildings and equipment, the 
capabilities of the healthcare community are further limited when crucial utilities, such as 
electricity, water and sewage, supply deliveries, and telecommunications, are knocked 
offline due to the disaster. One very common issue with all disasters is the loss of electric 
power. Most hospitals have backup generators; however, generators only work if they 
survive the disaster without any major damage and if they have fuel. Once fuel stored at 
the facility is used, it must be obtained from outside sources, a very complicated task 
when roads are impassable by floodwaters or collapsed buildings. Delivery of other 
supplies, both basic and crucial lifesaving medicine and equipment, can also be difficult 
or impossible when the disaster has caused all roads to be impassable. Finally, no modern 
healthcare facility operates without broadband data systems for communications and the 
transference of data. Losing data systems during disasters cuts off access to electronic 
medical records, diagnostic systems, and staff. This situation ultimately leads to reduced 
patient care (Mann, 2005).  
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At the same time that disasters reduce the capacities and capabilities of the 
healthcare system, they also create a surge in demand for medical care. Every disaster 
causes a surge in patients with a variety of injuries. Many of the injured require treatment 
for injuries sustained by the disaster itself, while others seek treatment for chronic 
medical conditions that can be exacerbated due to the disaster. When a disaster forces a 
hospital to close and evacuate, those patients are typically taken to nearby facilities. Even 
though the nearby facilities may have escaped the worst of the disaster and may even 
have experienced no damage, they usually suffer from reduced capabilities alongside a 
surge of admissions. This surge, both in regular and emergency admissions, results in 
serious shortages in personnel and supplies. This situation leads to the implementation of 
altered standards of care (IOM, 2006).  
The shortage of available personnel due to a disaster is another very important 
consideration for the healthcare community. For many healthcare professionals, these 
times of crisis create conflicting obligations. The need to take care of personal 
responsibilities oftentimes outweighs the obligation to perform professional duties after a 
disaster. Even when staff are willing to work, sometimes they are unable to work. 
Personal vehicles may have been destroyed and roads may be impassable. Other times, 
medical staff might find themselves in a situation where they deliver medical care to 
disaster victims at the scene. Although the community benefits when doctors and nurses 
are able assist in the treatment of the injured at the disaster site, this still leaves the 
hospital short of staff (ACEP, 2006).  
5. Potential Disasters in the United States  
Emergencies are an everyday occurrence within the United States. Few 
communities escape the impact of regularly occurring, low-level emergencies. 
Communities are likely to experience significant destruction from weather, earthquakes, 
or other possible disasters at some point. The impact of these disasters greatly varies as 
both a reflection of the hazard and the vulnerabilities of the population being affected. 
During times of disasters, hospitals and medical professionals must be prepared for a 
leadership role in preparedness and response efforts. Preparedness begins with the 
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recognition of what could happen in a major disaster. This section describes some of the 
major disasters that empirical evidence suggests will eventually happen in the United 
States (Hazard and Vulnerability Research Institute, [HVRI], 2008). 
1. New Madrid earthquake: As previously discussed, a NMSZ event 
would cause damage to several states in four FEMA regions and 
would cause an estimated $70 billion in damages (National 
Academy of Sciences, 1992, p. 159). 
2. Hurricane hits Miami/Herbert Hoover Dam breaks: This situation 
presents two disaster scenarios for southern Florida. The first 
includes a break in the Herbert Hoover Dike around Lake 
Okeechobee, which would flood 45,000 people. The second 
scenario involves a hurricane directly hitting Miami. This event 
would impact 7 million people.  
3. California earthquake: According to the USGS, within the next 30 
years there is a 99% chance of a magnitude 6.7 earthquake around 
the San Andreas Fault and a 46% chance of a magnitude 7.5 or 
greater. Earthquakes of this magnitude would cause approximately 
1,800 fatalities, 50,000 injured people seeking medical care, and 
1,600 building fires. Total damage could exceed $200 billion. 
4. Sacramento Flood: Extreme rainfall in the Sacramento Valley 
would cause high water levels in the Sacramento River. If multiple 
levees are breached, most of the metropolitan Sacramento area 
would be under 5 to 15 feet of water. 
5. Mississippi River flood: The Mississippi River floodplain stretches 
from southern Illinois through parts of Kentucky, Tennessee, 
Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana and includes several major 
cities. A disastrous flood in this region would impact millions of 
people and displace thousands. Additionally the region would have 
to deal with injured people, as well as the disruption of medical 
services.  
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6. Hurricane hits Houston/Galveston: If the eye of a hurricane passes 
over Galveston Island and moves inland toward Houston, a 20-foot 
surge of water would be pushed over Galveston and toward 
downtown Houston. Flooding would be widespread and disastrous. 
Medical services in the sixth largest U.S. metropolitan area would 
be devastated. 
7. Hurricane hits New York City: A major hurricane could push a 
storm surge up New York Bay into the Hudson River and even into 
the Long Island Sound. All five boroughs that make up New York 
City would be impacted by flooding, with Brooklyn and Queens 
being hit hardest. Much of south Manhattan would be under water. 
8. East Coast tsunami: Experts fear a massive landslide on the 
Canary Islands could send a huge tsunami across the Atlantic 
Ocean, striking numerous U.S. cities along the east coast. Cities 
from Boston to Miami would suffer destructive and deadly 
flooding. 
9. National heat wave and blackout: A widespread and sustained heat 
wave could cause enormous strains on vulnerable populations and 
the nation’s vulnerable electric grid. Numerous patients would 
seek medical care for heat-related illness, but many hospitals that 
lack sufficient backup power would close and those that remained 
open would fill beyond capacity. 
10. Extreme winter and heating fuel shortage: A particularly deadly 
disaster could result in a major supply disruption occurring during 
an extended period of widespread frigid weather. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Does existing altered-standards-of-care guidance at the federal, state and local 
government levels define the appropriate altered standards of care in order to optimize 
patient outcomes? 
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1. Supporting Questions 
Triggers: What criteria, if any, do local, state, and federal guidelines have for 
shifting from normal standards of care, in which resources are used to optimize individual 
outcomes, to altered standards of care, in which resources are used to optimize population 
outcomes? 
Minimum care: How are altered standards of care specified in the guidelines?  
Immunity: How do existing guidelines suggest laws intended to provide legal 
immunity from negligence, constitutional claims, and criminal prosecution? 
C. TENTATIVE SOLUTIONS 
A large-scale disaster or terrorist attack on the United States utilizing a weapon of 
mass destruction (WMD) device could result in mass casualties and a surge in demand 
for nations with an already stressed healthcare system. During a disaster or WMD mass 
casualty event, medical priorities shift from focusing on individual patient-based 
outcomes to population-based outcomes (PricewaterhouseCoopers’ Health Research 
Institute, 2007). Healthcare providers would have to triage victims in order to apportion 
limited equipment, supplies, personnel, and medication in a manner that saves the 
greatest number of lives (Burkle, 2006). Existing standards of care may need to be altered 
to respond to the imbalance between demands for healthcare and existing healthcare 
resources (Disaster Triage Systems for Large-Scale Catastrophic Events, 2008, p. 36). In 
addition, the scope of practice standards for physicians, nurses, and other healthcare 
professionals may need to be changed to allow them to provide care outside of their 
clinical specialty areas. Clinical decisions that involve altered standards of care will also 
present unique ethical challenges that may not be covered by state and federal liability 
laws.  
It is evident that federal, state, and local guidance documents fail to address 
triggers, guaranteed minimums of care, and legal immunity issues due to the newness of 
this field of study. Because of this lack of guidance, the following recommendations are 
suggested:  
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Triggers: There should be clearly defined triggers that indicate the shift from 
normal standards of care, in which resources are used to optimize individual outcomes, to 
altered standards of care, in which resources are used to optimize population outcomes. 
Triggers may be defined by the size (surge volume) and scope (geographic) of the 
WMD/disaster event. 
Guaranteed minimum care: There should be guaranteed medical interventions in 
the guidance regardless of surge volume and scope. This means that physicians, nurses, 
and other medial first-responders will not initiate such emergency procedures as mouth-
to-mouth resuscitation, external chest compression, electric shock, insertion of a tube to 
open the patient’s airway, injection of medication into the heart or open chest heart 
massage; however, it would guarantee the following minimum medical interventions: 
• Oxygen administration by means other than intubation; 
• Bleeding control; 
• Establishment of peripheral intravenous therapy lines for fluid administration; 
• Stabilization of fractures; 
• Pain management. 
Immunity: Patients may file lawsuits for monetary damages or other redress for 
injuries they believe they have suffered as a result of inadequate medical care received 
during disaster situations. The guidelines must suggest laws intended to provide legal 
immunity from liability for the payment of a judgment based on acts or omissions in 
providing services or immunity from being named as defendant in an action based on 
alleged acts or omissions, unless the conduct in question rises to the level of willful and 
wanton misconduct, or grossly negligent, reckless, or criminal conduct. 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The primary beneficiaries of this research are federal, state, and local disaster and 
WMD mass-casualty-response decision makers. As stated previously, there is little 
guidance available in the literature regarding the inclusion of triggers, guaranteed 
minimums of care, and legal immunity in the existing federal and state altered-standards-
of-care planning guidance documents.  
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This research will also support existing literature dealing with altered standards of 
care by giving additional planning guidance to healthcare planners in order to provide 
them with a level of comfort and certainty that their planning decisions are underpinned 
by competent and comprehensive research on the topic of altered standards of care. 
Consequently, the resulting plans they develop will allay the anxiety of those healthcare 
providers who are ultimately responsible for providing care in extreme disaster 
conditions.  
Further, this research will benefit homeland security practitioners and policy 
makers by exposing the vulnerabilities of existing altered-standards-of-care guidance 
documents and laws. Accordingly, the findings of this research will provide homeland 
security policy makers with the needed guidance to optimize patient outcomes in mass-
casualty events. It is expected that the findings of this research may reveal additional 
research opportunities that should be pursued to further improve altered-standards-of-care 
planning guidance that responds to the imbalance between demands for healthcare and 
existing healthcare resources in a manner that saves the largest number of lives.  
E. OVERVIEW OF THESIS CHAPTERS 
This thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter I (Introduction) introduces the 
concept of altered standards of care and explains why guidance documents at the federal, 
state, and local levels are inadequate. Attention is focused on examples of the challenges 
that confront the healthcare community during disasters.  
Chapter II (Literature Review) explores the literature surrounding altered 
standards of care from multiple federal, state, regulatory, and academic sources.  
Chapter III (Methodology) provides background on the process, selection, and 
application of the analytical tool used and assesses federal, state, and local altered-
standards-of-care plans against the analysis matrix.  
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Chapter IV (Analysis of Federal, State, Local, and International Altered-
Standards-of-Care Planning Guidance Documents) encompasses an analysis of the 
information collected pursuant to answering the secondary and primary research 
questions. The goal of this chapter is to evaluate, compare, and contrast the various 
guidance documents that exist at the federal, state, and local levels.  
Chapter V (Findings/Recommendations and Policy Implications) provides a 
summary of the findings of altered-standards-of-care information identified in previous 
chapters. Conclusions are presented and recommendations made to develop the inclusion 
of triggers, guaranteed minimums of care, and legal immunity into existing federal, state, 
and local altered-standards-of-care planning guidance documents. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature is replete with recent sources regarding altered standards of care 
that would be most relevant during a pandemic influenza, bioterrorist attack, or natural 
disaster in which healthcare providers would have to triage victims in order to apportion 
limited equipment, supplies, personnel, and medication in a manner that saves the 
greatest number of lives. The categories of literature are 1) federal government 
documents including those at the policy level, as well as studies and reports; 2) foreign 
government policy-level documents; 3) state government documents at the policy level, 
including legal standards addressing liability and emergency declarations; 4) regulatory 
standards for both healthcare facilities and health professionals; and 5) scholarly reports 
and studies regarding the impact of implementing altered standards of care during 
disasters and their application to all people. 
Overall, the literature indicates that in the healthcare industry, the term “standard 
of care,” as standards accepted by the healthcare profession, refers those standards that 
identify medical practice that is appropriate and acceptable. The literature reveals that 
these standards are typically developed by professional organizations, accrediting bodies, 
and government agencies at the federal and state level. Each source displays an intention 
that the development efforts associated with standards of care are intended to elucidate, 
create, and codify standards in an organized and accessible manner. Additionally, it is 
interesting to note the consistency in literature as to what serves as the core principle of 
altered standards of care—that being the principle that everyone is entitled to receive 
baseline medical care regardless of the disaster or emergency.  
A. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS 
The practice of receiving medical care from a healthcare professional is founded 
in a combination of generally accepted standards of professional practice (American 
Nurses Association [ANA], 2001b). These standards include standards of care, codes of 
ethics, legal regulation, institutional and personal values, and professional core 
competencies, as well as specific situational contexts (ANA, 2001a). Generally accepted 
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standards of care change when there is an extreme emergency, even before there is an 
official emergency declaration by a hospital or government authority. Such a change in 
context should not affect basic medical care standards, codes of ethics, professional core 
competences, or professional values. Although the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) and the National Response Framework (NRF) are somewhat helpful, 
they are not designed specifically to guide physicians, nurses, paramedics, or other 
licensed healthcare professionals working in extremely challenging situations in which 
the expectation is to deliver safe, legal, ethical, efficient, and compassionate medical 
care. 
The issue of addressing altered standards of care for use in emergency or disaster 
situations arose in 2004, when the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) 
and the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) within the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) convened experts to discuss the issues 
directly. Their work led to a 2005 report, “Altered Standards of Care in Mass Casualty 
Events,” as a useful guide for developing protocols for an altered standard of care. A 
subsequent report, “Mass Medical Care with Scarce Resources: A Community Planning 
Guide,” (2007) outlines a proposed framework for planning efforts. 
Since the release of the AHRQ reports, several federal documents have been 
published to assist states and the local healthcare community in developing altered-
standard-of-care protocols for the allocation of scarce resources and for standards of care. 
Nevertheless, a recent report on state preparedness by the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) and a review of HHS’s Hospital Preparedness Program by 
the Center for Biosecurity of UPMC concluded that, among the key comments of medical 
surge planning, standards of care during a mass casualty event remained in need of 
significant additional attention and planning. Areas of particular concern were the need 
for states to develop procedures and protocols for implementing altered standards of care 
in disaster and declared emergency situations. The literature affiliated with the federal 
government was found to be the most useful sources. The objective information provided 
by these sources is valuable in that it outlines many specific planning efforts that must 
take place in order to implement altered standards of care. These sources point to the 
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development of medical protocols and the allocation of scarce medical resources. 
Additionally, they emphasize a national interest in developing such processes by which 
altered standards of care can be implemented in order to ensure a positive outcome for 
those injured by and for those responding to a pandemic influenza, bioterrorist attack, or 
natural disaster. 
B. FOREIGN GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS 
The threat of a catastrophic mass-casualty incident resulting in tens of thousands 
of victims related to a public health event, such as an influenza pandemic, or a terrorist 
event, such as the detonation of an improvised nuclear device, is internationally accepted 
(Hawryluck, Lapinsky, and Stewart, 2005, p. 384). It is also internationally accepted that 
most countries do not necessarily have sufficient healthcare staff, equipment, and 
physical space to provide urgent care to those critically injured by such dire events (IOM, 
2006).  
From the perspective of the United Kingdom’s healthcare system, while much 
progress has been made in preparedness for medical disasters, the system is ill-prepared 
for catastrophic mass-casualty events. As a result of this significant shortfall, public 
health authorities in the United Kingdom have developed a planning guidance document 
to assist their country’s healthcare infrastructure to plan for and respond to catastrophic 
mass-casualty events caused by a natural or manmade disaster. 
The United Kingdom plan, “Mass Casualty Incidents: A Framework for 
Planning,” provides a set of principles to guide National Health Service (NHS) 
organizations in England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and the Republic of Ireland 
in planning for incidents that produce mass casualties. This document is supporting 
material to the NHS Emergency Planning Guidance (EPG) 2005, and NHS encourages 
planners to use this document in conjunction with that EPG guidance. This current 
document consolidates various aspects of planning guidance initially issued immediately 
after September 2001. As part of wider cross-government work on resilience planning, 
this document was written to strengthen planning and ensure greater resilience to a wider 
range and larger scale of disruptive mass-casualty incidents. 
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The international literature was extremely useful in demonstrating that events 
resulting in mass casualties occur on a frequent basis worldwide (International Disaster 
Database, 2010). Luckily, the overwhelming majority of these events do not produce 
extremely large numbers of victims who are critically injured. Sources indicate that, like 
the United States, international planning efforts for mass critical care have been 
motivated by recent natural disasters, terrorist attacks, the severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) epidemic of 2002–2003 (Christain et al., 2004, p. 1420), and the 
continued threat of a serious pandemic influenza. While the most recent H1N1 influenza 
pandemic was found to be relatively less dangerous and fatal compared to other 
pandemics, it is important to understand that during the twentieth century alone there 
have been three recognized influenza pandemics—in 1918, 1957, and 1968—each 
causing an estimated 50 million deaths worldwide (Health Protection Agency, 2010). 
C. STATE GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS 
A majority of states have not adopted any form of altered-standard of care policy 
guidance for their healthcare communities. The few that have—California, Colorado, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, and New York—only address altered standards 
of care for a pandemic event, not a large-scale natural disaster or emergency WMD 
situation. Those states that did address the altered-standard-of-care issues followed either 
the national standard of care or the locality rule, which tends to focus on local history to 
determine the appropriate level of medical care that will be provided. The locality rule, 
developed over one hundred years ago, was intended to protect small-town and rural 
physicians, who were assumed to be less educated and equipped than physicians in large 
cities. The standard of care under the locality rule measures the conduct of a physician 
against that of other physicians in the same field operating within the same community. 
Thus, it gauges medical care by the degree of care, skill, and proficiency commonly 
exercised by ordinarily careful, skillful, and prudent physicians at the same time the 
treatment was provided and in similar localities (Lewis, Gohagan, and Merenstein, 2007).  
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The states that follow the national standard of care base their policy standards on 
whether a physician has exercised the “care and skill expected of a reasonably competent 
physician in [that] specialty in the same or similar circumstances” (Rosenbaum, 2003, 
p. 1546). Interestingly, states that use the national standard still consider locality as a 
factor when considering whether a physician acted reasonably under the given 
circumstances. Twenty-nine states, including the District of Columbia, have adopted the 
national standard of care, and 21 states follow the locality rule (Kinney et al., 2008).  
Sources affiliated with state government conflict with federal government sources 
in that the former tend to focus only on altered standards for a pandemic influenza event. 
Instead of focusing on expanding the use of altered standards of care for any disaster or 
emergency situation, these sources look critically and holistically at pandemic influenza 
policy and its effect on patients and healthcare providers.  
D. REGULARITY STANDARDS 
The healthcare industry is probably the most regulated industry in the United 
States. Countless numbers of federal, state, and industry-driven regulatory bureaucracies 
govern both healthcare professionals and facilities in an effort to achieve a variety of 
regulatory objectives. These regulatory objectives involve licensure, accreditation, and 
legal issues (Joint Commission, 2009). 
A review of the federal Medicare program and joint federal-state Medicaid 
programs indicates a host of statutory and regulatory rules governing the delivery of 
health care and designed to ensure that citizens receive the highest quality heath care 
available (Kinney, 2006, p. 559). These standards focus on the conduct of the providers, 
especially during very extraordinary situations where such standards can be waived by 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). CMS is the agency within the 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) that oversees Medicare and 
Medicaid. CMS has the sole authority to waive point liability for hospital emergency 
rooms under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA). This was 
found to be a significant issue since, even if a state issues a disaster declaration, without 
the CMS waiver, hospitals are not allowed to transfer patients to other facilities for 
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assessment if the original facility is located in an area where a public health emergency 
had been declared. CMS can also waive certain requirements of the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) so that providers can talk to family members 
about a patient’s condition when the patient is unable to grant that permission to the 
provider.  
The literature supports the fact that during disasters and emergencies there is 
broad disparity among international, federal, state, and healthcare industry regulatory 
issues that are intended to enable both healthcare professionals and facilities to respond 
optimally to an event necessitating altered standards of care. As an example, all 
governors have special legal authority to declare a disaster and to suspend any laws, 
rules, and regulations they deem necessary to respond to the event; however, those 
special powers do not allow governors to suspend EMTALA or HIPAA regulations 
(Hoffman, Goodman, and Stier, 2008). That disparity is a significant flaw, and 
considering that both healthcare professionals and facilities have a vested interest in the 
outcome of altered standards of care, neither can be regarded as entirely objective.  
E. SCHOLARLY REPORTS AND STUDIES 
Although there is scholarly literature documenting the outcome of proposed 
altered standards of care and other scientific implications of such emergency situations, 
serious efforts to identify and characterize related altered standards of care were rare 
before the terrorist events of September 11, 2001. The gap in literature points to an 
uncertainty surrounding the potential risks for healthcare providers likely to become 
involved in a response to a pandemic influenza and other emergencies, including 
government employees, private-sector healthcare providers, and volunteers who may not 
choose to alter the standard of care they are providing their patients while others 
responding to the incident alter medical care for their patients (GAO, 2008). That risk can 
be summarized by the fear of legal action against those who would work under such 
disaster situations. Their fear is given credence in the face of the charges filed against 
nurses and Dr. Anna Maria Pou for failure to care and inappropriate use of medication in 
New Orleans following the flooding associated with hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Pou and 
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two nurses were arrested in July 2006 and accused of administering lethal doses of 
medications to four older adult patients, thereby intentionally killing them. Dr. Pou has 
asserted that the medications were given only to relieve pain and distress. The attorney 
general in Louisiana did not pursue charges against the nurses in exchange for their 
cooperation, and the grand jury ultimately did not indict Dr. Pou. However, three civil 
suits, filed by the deceased patients’ relatives, are pending against Pou (Okie, 2008, 
p. 358). With such reports in the literature, the need to study the various sweeping 
generalizations about altered standards of care is great.  
F. CONCLUSION 
This section has reviewed the available literature as to the importance of being 
able to adapt and provide medical care under extreme disaster and emergency situations. 
A disaster event with mass causalities is a profound life-impacting event that can lead to 
devastating consequences. Under optimum conditions, however, the implementation of 
altered standards of care can greatly increase the quality of life of individuals injured by 
such an event. The consensus development process and quantitative methodology process 
described in the present literature is useful for planning. The concept of altered standards 
of care was not introduced until recently, and there is still much to be learned. The 
benefits are not yet completely known, but those benefits that have been documented 
cannot be ignored. Additionally, the paucity of literature supports the importance of 
continued research in this area, especially in the development of triggers, guaranteed 
minimums of care, and liability protection for healthcare providers. 
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The methodology for this thesis will be a policy analysis examining altered-
standard-of-care planning documents of the U. S. government, the United Kingdom, and 
nine U.S. states and local governments. The analysis will develop a policy 
recommendation for the inclusion of triggers, guaranteed minimums of care, and legal 
immunity into existing federal, state, and local altered-standard-of-care planning 
guidance documents. 
The three components selected for analysis are strategically focused. Triggers are 
those specific conditions that when present give the responding agencies the best possible 
indication that an altered standard of care is warranted. A trigger can, for example, be 
likened to the presence, frequency, and intensity of particular signs and symptoms that 
indicate myocardial infarction and thus a specific protocol. In the conditions of a disaster 
mass-casualty event, certain triggers would indicate a change in approach or a different 
guaranteed level of care and thus a shift in legal ramifications for the medical care 
provided. 
The guaranteed level of care is a critical component because of the phenomenal 
developments in medical science and care throughout the world. The citizens of the 
United States have come to expect and demand a certain level of care in all situations. 
We have seen these issues emerge in recent years. An example is the care and evacuation 
(or not) of patients and citizens in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. 
In the event of the implementation of altered standards of care, the legal 
ramifications must be addressed, or the policies will break down at the caregiver level 
when malpractice risk is at its height. The analysis will consider what immunity is 
indicated and whether it is significant enough to provide protection from legal battles and 
extensive proofs in individual cases. 
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In formulating this policy recommendation, consideration will be given to ethical 
values that should be used to develop altered-standard-of-care policies that are 
recommended to guide and support decision making during both preparation and 
response at the federal and state levels. 
B. SAMPLE 
All research questions will be answered by conducting a policy analysis using the 
following steps: 
1. Compile available policy planning documents; 
2. Identify information gaps; 
3. Perform an analysis of all information gathered; 
4. Develop answers for secondary questions; and 
5. Develop findings for the primary question.  
Once answers to the secondary questions have been developed, an analysis of the 
answers will be performed to develop a solution to the primary research question. This 
solution will be evaluated for viability based on feasibility and impact on mass-casualty 
patient care. 
C. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
Steps 1 and 2 of this methodology have been addressed in the literature review. 
As discussed previously, the literature provides sufficient information on existing federal 
altered-standard-of-care documents, including those at the policy level, as well as studies 
and reports of state and local government documents at the policy level and legal 
standards addressing liability and emergency declarations. The review examined 
regulatory standards for healthcare facilities and health professionals, scholarly reports, 
and studies regarding the impact of implementing altered standards of care during 
disasters and their application to all people. 
Step 3 will encompass an analysis of the plans collected from the U.S. 
government, the United Kingdom, and the following nine U.S. states and local 
governments in the attempt to answer the secondary and primary research questions. The 
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selection of these particular nine states within the United States is based on their use of 
the most developed policies for altered standards of care in disaster situations. The 
following nine states or locations were considered:  
1. Tennessee; 
2. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; 
3. Tacoma/Pierce County, Washington; 
4. California; 
5. Colorado; 




The goal of the analysis is to evaluate, compare, and contrast the various federal, 
international, and state guidance documents. The analysis will focus on the variables of 
triggers, guaranteed levels of care, and legal immunity. For example, in reviewing the 
plans, is there a clear articulation of what triggers the implementation of an alternate 
standard of care? How do these triggers compare to other equally developed state or 
federal guidelines? Is legal immunity specified to the degree that healthcare providers can 
act confidently, and if not, what are the gaps that must be addressed to improve the 
overall implementation of altered standards of care? Research obtained from this step will 
contribute to improved federal and state altered-standard-of-care policies that can serve 
as the bedrock for public policy. 
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Table 1.   Components and Review Elements 
 
The goal of step 4 is to finalize the answers to the secondary questions. This 
information is vital to developing a solution(s) to the primary research question. 
During step 4, the altered-standard-of-care information identified in step 3 will be 
further analyzed to develop a recommendation for the inclusion of triggers, guaranteed 
minimums of care, and legal immunity into existing federal, state, and local altered-
standard-of-care planning guidance documents. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL, AND 
INTERNATIONAL ALTERED-STANDARDS-OF-CARE PLANNING 
GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS 
A. ANALYSIS 
1. The United States: Mass Medical Care with Scarce Resources: A 
Community Planning Guide 
a. Guiding Principle 
The intent of the federal document is to provide healthcare planners at the 
hospital, community, state, and federal levels with credible information that will assist in 
planning for and responding to a potential mass-casualty incident. Developed by the 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), the document is an updated 
version of an earlier plan that outlined the issues and principles associated with providing 
medical care in the face of an overwhelming number of casualties. The new document is 
the result of a collaborative effort between the Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Preparedness and Response (ASPR) within the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) and AHRQ. The updated plan, which is 181 pages long, explores the 
relevant issues and challenges and makes recommendations associated with preparing for 
and responding to a mass-casualty incident affecting the entire healthcare spectrum.  
The federal document leads off with a discussion of ethical and legal 
considerations and then outlines the issues linked to mass-casualty incident planning in 
three healthcare settings: prehospital, hospital, and alternative care sites. The document 
then discusses palliative care issues, which it stresses must be integrated throughout the 
entire planning and response process. The document concludes with a case study of an 
influenza pandemic. Key findings that emerge from examining the U.S. plan are 
summarized below.  
 
 30
The federal document outlines five principles that should be used to 
develop mass-casualty incident response plans. The first principle is to keep the 
healthcare system functioning and to deliver an acceptable quality of care in order to 
preserve as many lives as possible. The second principle emphasizes the need for plans to 
be comprehensive, community based, and coordinated. The third principle calls for an 
adequate legal framework for providing health and medical care during a mass-casualty 
incident. Principle four states that the rights of individuals must be protected to the extent 
possible and reasonable under the circumstances, and the last principle provides for clear 
communication with the public before, during, and after a mass-casualty incident. 
Additionally, ethical considerations are included, emphasizing the 
importance that healthcare planners understand that, once a mass-causality incident 
occurs, immensely difficult healthcare decisions will have to be made. In order for those 
decisions to be ethically sound, the plan introduces major substantive and competing 
ethical theories relevant to planning efforts. The plan reviews these theories in the 
broadest terms and outlines more specific issues that each theory raises. By doing this, 
the document suggests that planning should follow a set of norms that are transparent, 
accountable, and capable of community outreach. This ensures that citizens are educated 
and prepared to accept the implementation of such plans when a mass-casualty incident 
occurs. Additionally, the document suggests that the planning process be grounded by the 
ethical principles of focusing on consequences, duties, obligations, rights, and the 
fairness aspect of community norms. 
Legal Issues are a component of the document, which informs healthcare 
planners about the common legal issues that should be addressed in their plans; it is not 
intended to give specific legal advice for any jurisdiction. Planners should understand 
that laws at all government levels are an important element of emergency responses and 
healthcare decisions involving scarce resources during a mass-casualty incident. Legal 
issues that should be taken into consideration include understanding the changing legal 




suspension of existing legal requirements, interjurisdictional legal coordination issues, 
medical licensure reciprocity, liability and other protections for healthcare workers and 
volunteers, property management and control, and legal triage.  
b. The Response Component 
During a mass-casualty incident, prehospital care provided by emergency 
medical services (EMS) plays a vital role. EMS services rescue victims, assess injuries, 
provide medical care, and transport victims to appropriate medical facilities. This section 
of the document discusses how EMS systems operate and details recommendations to 
address the challenges associated with the planning and coordination of EMS due to the 
systems’ fragmented nature of training, guidelines, and response capacity. 
Some of the most difficult decisions associated with any mass-casualty 
incident are made at hospitals regarding acute care and altered standards of care. The 
overarching goal of any hospital during a mass-casualty incident response is to maximize 
care across the greatest number of people, while meeting at least minimal obligations for 
care to all who are in need. In the event of a mass-casualty incident, hospitals have to 
grapple with issues associated with surge capacity, supplies, limited staff, coordination, 
incompatibilities in communications systems, and the need for security. To address these 
issues, this section provides recommendations for hospitals to plan for allocating scarce 
resources during a mass-casualty incident. The section provides planners with ideas to 
develop integrated and coordinated response systems to provide the best medical care for 
all victims.  
When hospitals are completely overwhelmed due to a mass-casualty event, 
planners should consider the establishment of alternate care sites. Alternate care sites are 
typically housed in tents or mobile units and are intended to provide the medical care that 
normally would be provided in an inpatient facility (hospital). Advance planning is 
critical to the establishment and operation of these sites; this planning must be 
coordinated with existing healthcare facilities as well as home-care entities. Planners 
must delineate the specific medical functions and treatment objectives of the site. The  
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principle of managing patients under relatively austere conditions—with only limited 
supplies, equipment, and access to pharmaceuticals, and with a minimal staffing 
arrangement—is the starting point for planning.  
The federal document addresses the issue of how to provide optimal 
support with the least resources for dying victims of a mass-casualty incident. It is widely 
assumed that some victims may survive the initial part of the disaster but will have 
sustained such serious illness or injury that they will not survive for any length of time. 
Additionally, there will be vulnerable individuals (e.g., the elderly, those sick in hospitals 
and nursing homes, the disabled, children) who may be negatively impacted by the 
resulting scarcity of resources. In some instances, decisions will need to be made to 
withdraw resources from those not likely to survive and to divert those resources to 
others. When that happens, palliative care is utilized to aggressively manage symptoms, 
relieve suffering, and provide comfort to those whose lives will be lost as a result of the 
mass-casualty incident. These issues need to be carefully planned for, and this section 
offers guidance on how to address palliative care in the areas of decision making, 
supplies, resources, training, personnel, and patient education and communication.  
c. Secondary Questions 
Table 2.   The Federal Document: Components and Review Elements 
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2. The United Kingdom: Mass-Casualty Incidents: A Framework for 
Planning 
a. Guiding Principle 
The U.K. document provides a set of principles to guide National Health 
Service (NHS) organizations in England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and the 
Republic of Ireland in planning for incidents that produce mass casualties. This document 
is supporting material to the NHS Emergency Planning Guidance (EPG) 2005, and NHS 
encourages planners to use this document in conjunction with that EPG guidance. This 
current document consolidates various planning guidance initially issued immediately 
after September 2001. As part of wider cross-government work on resilience planning, 
this document was written to strengthen planning and to ensure greater resilience to a 
wider range and larger scale of disruptive mass-casualty incidents.  
The U.K. planning document, which is 35 pages long, begins with an 
explanation of the framework used to develop the document. The crux of the guidance is 
that it is built on best practices and shared knowledge from all NHS programs. 
Throughout the plan, NHS stresses that communication among all components of the 
U.K.’s healthcare delivery systems should remain appropriate in order to ensure that 
response efforts across the healthcare spectrum are structured and cohesive. Key findings 
that emerge from examining the U.K. plan are summarized below. 
b. Response Component 
Considering the varying and complex nature of any mass-casualty 
incident, the U.K. document provides NHS organizations with a framework to reference 
while writing their mass-casualty incident response plans. The framework assists 
planners in defining the size of a mass-casualty incident as a means to begin their 
planning process (see below). By encouraging planners to base planning assumptions on 
the scale provided in the framework, the NHS attempts to ensure that planners fully 
understand the potential scale and nature of disruption that their organization will need to 
address once a mass-casualty incident begins. 
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Table 3.   NHS Mass Casualties Levels 
 
Every day, the NHS manages the care and wellbeing of many people. 
Decisions about the clinical care of patients in the U.K. is made by multidisciplinary 
teams of specialists, providing in-depth and complex care within established clinical 
protocols and guidance. However, during an event that causes mass casualties, the U.K. 
document demonstrates steps to planners to expand the capacity of certain types of 
specialties based upon the type of incident, e.g., burn trauma victims, pediatrics, etc. 
Under these horrible circumstances, the need to temporarily realign treatment protocols 
for patient care must be made. While the U.K. plan states that this decision must 
ultimately be made by physicians at the time of the incident. taking into account the 
circumstances, the ultimate aim at that point is to plan for providing the best care possible 
under the circumstances within the healthcare capacity available.  
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Figure 3 illustrates planning assumptions that NHS expects planners to use 
when calculating the potential number of patients in each category listed.  
Figure 3.   NHS Planning Assumptions 
The component of the plan related to managing clinical care gives 
consideration to the fact that incidents can occur beyond those for which hospital 
buildings are designed to cope and that this, combined with potential staff constraints, 
would have an impact on the way in which patient care could, and would, be delivered. 
This section further illustrates how planners can develop integrated plans to set up and 
provide facilities—away from acute hospital sites—to assist in the triage, diagnosis, 
treatment, and support of mass-casualty victims who are not seriously ill or injured. This 
section outlines three components that should be included in any mass-casualty incident 
plan. The first component calls for the development of contingencies to avoid the need to 
move patients from one community to another and to avoid referrals to acute hospitals as 
far as possible. The second includes the suggestions to develop plans to deploy healthcare 
providers to supplement acute services and lastly to provide clinical indemnity and 
support for colleagues who may be working in a different environment from their normal 
place of work. The overall aim of this entire section is a systems approach to admit to 
hospitals those most seriously ill or injured by the mass-casualty incident.  
The United Kingdom recognizes that effective mutual aid across the 
healthcare sector requires leadership and coordination in advance of any incident. This 
section of the document guides planners in developing mutual aid agreements beyond 
hospitals alone, but to include the military and ambulance service providers. With the 
exception of immediate lifesaving action, any requests for U.K. military assistance must 
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be carefully considered in advance and should be directed at the time of the incident via 
regional strategic command teams. Ambulance services in the United Kingdom require 
that plans be in place to deploy large numbers of vehicles, staff, and equipment to the 
scene. The establishment of mutual aid agreements that detail early command, control, 
and triage arrangements at the scene is critical to a successful response.  
Since all disasters are local, the U.K. plan recognizes that, for the majority 
of major incidents, local interagency command and control mechanisms will be 
sufficient, but for bigger, truly catastrophic events further strategic coordination of the 
NHS may be needed. Since strategic health authorities and their regional directors of 
public health have pivotal roles in coordination, the U.K. document recognizes the need 
to link the local response to national coordination. The strategic command arrangements 
section points out that during the planning phase it is important that an agreement is 
reached among all healthcare providers so that disruption of essential services is limited. 
The impact of an actual mass-casualty incident will severely challenge the 
coordination and communications capacity of all NHS organizations. Local NHS 
organizations must plan for a management structure in a mass-casualty incident with a 
clear understanding of how things will be organized and particularly of who is directing 
resources. The NHS guidance makes clear that the Department of Health will establish 
national coordinating arrangements if an incident escalates outside the capacity of an 
SHA region or where the incident has a national impact. Since this involves multiple 
levels of coordination and communication, the document outlines planning considerations 
that must be made.  
 37
c. Secondary Questions 
Table 4.   United Kingdom: Components and Review Elements 
 
3. Tennessee 
a. Guiding Principle 
The altered-standard-of-care plan of the Tennessee Department of Health 
for allocation of resources to physicians and healthcare workers in a health crisis does not 
delineate between different types of disasters that might trigger a need to allocate 
resources differently. A terrorist attack is deemed to create the same type of allocation 
concerns as a pandemic outbreak of a type A influenza virus. Patient care and reciprocal 
health organization collaboration are presented as being identical regardless of the health 
emergency facing providers. This is a logical weakness that fails to note that a terrorist-
inspired biological weapons attack is limited to specific regions and that infrastructures 
and resources beyond the immediate need zone may affect how critical shortages are and 
the circumstances under which replacement of critical resources can occur. 
The plan is designed to “provide governmental leaders and healthcare 
professionals with an ethical framework to guide and support decision-making at the 
state, local and facility level” (Tennessee Department of Health, 2009, p. 2) in the 
preparation and response to disasters. The ethical issue is utilitarian in its approach to 
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resolving problems. The ethical concern is presented as the welfare of the community 
over the welfare of individuals, and the unspoken guideposts are a need to foster the 
greatest good for the greatest number of people. 
The plan offers six guidelines for the allocation of scarce medical 
resources and the triage of patients. The six guidelines are: Duty to Plan; Duty to Care; 
Reciprocity; Stewardship of Resources; Respect for Human Dignity; and 
Communication. Each of these guidelines supports the foundational ethical imperative to 
serve the interests of the community. The role of the individual is defined by the 
individual’s value to the community, and throughout the plan this perspective is 
repeatedly stressed. The guidelines presented are fluid according to the level of 
healthcare crisis facing the community. The plan classifies healthcare emergencies into 
three categories: Early Public Health Emergency; Worsening Public Health Emergency; 
and Worst-Case Public Health Emergency. 
There is no discussion of the underlying ethical framework that allows 
physicians, nurses, and other hospital staff (presumably administrators, if they are present 
in the physical plant) to evaluate the various likelihoods of survival and then make triage 
decisions accordingly. The plan provides concrete examples of needs that are already 
recognized but fails to discuss any ethical issues that may allow physicians, nurses, and 
other staff and government officials to create a carefully articulated manifesto of what, 
exactly, constitutes the greatest good for the greatest number of people. 
b. Response Component 
The overriding concern for the greatest good for the community is present 
even in the least dire category, Early Public Health Emergency. The scenario suggests 
that the public and healthcare professionals will view early warnings of potential 
healthcare disasters with skepticism. A special condition is evaluated in each scenario 
that sets possible healthcare professional absenteeism as a contributing factor to 
determining allocation of care. The skepticism present with Early Public Health 
Emergencies is demonstrated by a projected zero absenteeism rate for hospital workers.  
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The Worsening phase is projected to have a 20–30 percent absenteeism rate among 
hospital staff, and the Worst-Case scenario projects a 40 percent absenteeism rate for 
hospital staff. 
One failing of the plan is its unknown definition of hospital staff workers. 
While the plan does on occasion refer to hospital and healthcare professionals, there is no 
formal definition of what constitutes a healthcare professional versus a healthcare worker. 
The authoring committee for the plan included three hospital administrators, three 
attorneys, four physicians, a Ph.D. in public health, and a single registered nurse. Given 
traditional schisms that continue to exist between physicians and nurses regarding 
whether nursing is a profession or a job, the absence of any fixed definition regarding the 
meaning of worker versus professional makes the understanding of the absenteeism 
projections difficult. Are nurses included in the term staff? Are physicians and 
administrators included in the term? The definition of staff segments should be expanded 
to allow for a comprehensive understanding of how absenteeism among specific classes 
of healthcare personnel might affect the quality of care that can be provided.  
Additional issues with the broad use of the term staff include the absence 
of any discussion of nurse practitioners. If anesthesiologists have a high rate of 
absenteeism at a hospital during a Worst-Case Condition crisis, but the number of nurse 
anesthesiologists is more than sufficient to meet patient needs, the absence of 
anesthesiologists is rendered moot. The failure to segment and carefully define hospital 
staff remains a problem with the state’s 2010 addendum to the drafted protocols. 
Concerns with appropriate triage models are more specific and relevant to 
the need to create fluid guidelines that allow a certain degree of autonomy among 
healthcare workers to deal with the real-world and real-time needs of a major medical 
crisis when few resources are available. 
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Reverse triage guidelines follow frameworks that also follow a “greatest 
good for the greatest number of people” construct. Telephone triage constructs are 
prominent and used primarily to screen for those who actually need the attention of a 
“hospital staffer,” although, again, the precise nature of who or what constitutes a 
hospital staffer is left to the reader to decide. 
The most concrete protocols involve segmenting resources by type of 
resource: oxygen, medications (although no subsets of medication are listed), 
hemodynamic support and IV fluids, mechanical ventilation, nutrition, and staffing. The 
protocols for all resources except staffing are clear and follow what appear to be realistic 
adaptations to the three levels of crisis (Early, Worsening, and Worst-Case). The 
protocols for staffing are less clear and suggest possible remedies that do not, at first 
evaluation, appear to have a realistic foundation.  
There is a consensus that reciprocity of staffing can occur between 
medical and healthcare institutions, but no consideration is given as to how “extra” staff 
can be found at one institution if a pandemic is affecting populations on a local, regional, 
or even national level. It is also suggested that academics can assume clinical roles in 
providing assistance to patients, but there is no requirement that academic physicians 
have clinical hours each year to prepare for full-time clinical care in an emergency. 
There are lengthy sections devoted to alternatives for diminishing 
resources such as oxygen and vital fluids. However, the protocols show little in the way 
of strategic planning, other than suggestions that inventories be maintained and that 
backup generators and alternative forms of electrical power be available for periods of as 
long as thirty days. 
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c. Secondary Questions 
Table 5.   Tennessee: Components and Review Elements 
 
4. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania  
a. Guiding Principle 
The plan of the Philadelphia Department of Public Health (DOPH) is 
limited to scenarios involving pandemic disease, specifically a pandemic outbreak of a 
type-A virus related to the Spanish influenza outbreak of 1918–1919. The concentration 
on a single type of crisis allows the Philadelphia plan to be far more specific and detailed 
in its protocols than the Tennessee plan. The Philadelphia plan, for example, assumes that 
the long duration of an influenza pandemic will preclude the possibility of federal 
assistance to augment state and local operations. The pandemic outbreak pattern can be 
extrapolated with reasonable accuracy to either the traditional U pattern (with most 
deaths occurring in the elderly and the young) or the classic W pattern of the Spanish 
influenza outbreak (where most deaths occur in age groups 18–40 and the elderly and 
very young are far less affected). It is also possible to project public health needs more 
accurately since pandemic influenza can infect and cause non-life-threatening illness in 
as many as one-third to half of all living people. Infection rates will create great demand 
for medical examinations and secondary medications for those persons who are infected 
but do not fall prey to the actual influenza. 
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Frameworks are more detailed because the period of need where no 
outside assistance occurs is far greater than that of a natural disaster such with hurricanes 
Camille or Katrina or even a biological attack by terrorists. The existence of well-
established and credible paradigms for pandemic influenza response, such as the 
Pandemic Severity Index constructed by the United States Centers for Disease Control 
(CDC), allows the plan to provide very carefully delineated response models for very 
specific phases of a pandemic influenza outbreak. 
b. Response Component 
There are numerous diagrams and sociograms for communication and 
collaboration among agencies and organizations and additional graphic illustrations of 
how communication and collaboration can occur within each agency and organization. 
The Tennessee plan never moves beyond very broad generalizations of response, in part 
because it is not a plan for a variety of public health crises. The Philadelphia plan has the 
luxury of a known topic with a well-understood life cycle. Extrapolation of response is 
also aided by the presence of significant technology that can rapidly develop vaccines for 
new strains of pandemic influenza. The assumptions of time frames to develop vaccines 
and the difficulties with shifting construction of an influenza virus are demonstrated by 
the 2009 swine flu pandemic. 
In April 2009, a new form of A/H1N1, later labeled 2009 A/H1N1, was 
identified in Mexico (Cohen, 2009). Initial identification of the new strain mistakenly 
determined that it was a far less virulent B-type virus (Cohen, 2009). The outbreak was 
correctly identified seven weeks later as a new strain of A/H1N1. The first cases in 
Mexico were followed by the appearance of the virus in the United States in April 2009 
(Cohen, 2009). Physicians in Mexico sent samples of the new virus to labs at the World 
Health Organization (WHO) and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC).  
Scientists also posted samples of the virus to GenBank, a public web site 
operated by a division of the United States National Institutes of Health (NIH). The site 
provides free online access to all known virus DNA sequences. More than two hundred 
samples of the new virus were posted within the first four weeks of the appearance of the 
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virus (Cohen, 2009). The ability to view hundreds of samples of the virus facilitated the 
design of a vaccine in approximately four weeks (Cohen, 2009). The existence of this 
type of technology resolves many problems that might ordinarily arise with non-influenza 
pandemics. 
An ethical care committee working with established life cycles of 
pandemic influenza outbreaks developed ethical triage and care frameworks. The 
specificity of the health crisis permits greater articulation of ethical protocols that reflect 
the utilitarian ideal of the greatest good for the greatest number of people. The response 
model consists of care and treatment facilities designed to work with four levels of 
patients. All patient levels are assigned a high likelihood for survival. The design of the 
program incorporates a reverse triage process that ensures that only those likely to 
survive or with a high potential for survival receive vital and scarce resources. 
For all of its specificity, the plan does not conclusively identify a criterion 
to determine whether a patient is too ill to receive treatment. The plan states that an 
“ethics committee” continues to work on this pressing issue. The plan required 
approximately eighteen months to complete, and its total length is 320 pages. The ethics 
question is the only unfinished portion of the plan. 
The protocols and chain of command to establish collaboration methods 
and sharing of scarce resources is very similar to the Tennessee plan, except that 
protocols are offered in greater detail due to the limitation of the crisis being discussed. A 
pandemic influenza outbreak is a known situation. The plan does definitively create a 
classification for “too sick” patients in situations where life-saving resources are subject 
to shortages. But the plan only defines a “too sick” patient as “chances for survival of this 
type of patient are assessed to be minimal” (Philadelphia Department of Public Health, 
2007, p. 18). The ethical imperatives of deciding what to do with “too sick” patients and 
whether proactive lethal medication, such as that practiced by Dr. Pou in New Orleans 
during Katrina and its aftermath, is an option in certain crisis situations. 
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The plan is detailed but unremarkable in its recommendations for altered 
standards of care and for resource allocation during a pandemic influenza outbreak. It 
skirts the ethical question of how to best allocate resources through an ethics mechanism 
that remains a work in progress. It is likely that the conclusions of the ethics committee 
will remain a work in progress for some time. The outbreak of 2009 A/H1N1 was 
insufficient to push Philadelphia’s DOPH to resolve the ethical concerns of “too sick” 
patients. This may be due to the DOPH’s limited mandate over the metropolis of 
Philadelphia, or it may involve political fears that defining “too sick” could result in 
political and social repercussions that include, but are not limited to, loss of federal and 
state funding and adverse social reactions that could harm tourism.  
c. Secondary Questions 
Table 6.   Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Components and Review Elements 
 
5. Tacoma/Pierce County, Washington 
a. Guiding Principle 
The Tacoma Pierce County (TPC) Pandemic Influenza Medical Response 
Model is figuratively and literally a twin of the Philadelphia plan. The sections defining 
“too sick” patients are identical, and the composition of the ethics committees that are 
continuing to investigate the best approach to allocating resources in a crisis situation is 
 45
different only in the makeup of committee members. The PRC committee includes a 
wider sampling of healthcare personnel and institutions and includes representatives of 
the emergency medical response teams and paramedic teams, United States military 
personnel from the Rapid Response Division of the United States Department of Medical 
Military Preparedness, members of the CDC, members of nonprofit nongovernmental 
organizations such as the Red Cross, and several representatives of private community 
for-profit medical practices. The wider representation appears to reflect a genuine effort 
to mold an all-inclusive response model for pandemic influenza outbreaks. 
The TPC plan differs somewhat from the Philadelphia plan in that 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have a more prominent role in assessing patients 
and providing early triage of populations during the first stage of an influenza outbreak. 
The graphic representations of chain of command, public communication practices, and 
collaborative protocols between hospitals and healthcare agencies are verbatim that of 
Philadelphia’s plan. Both plans were drafted in 2007, and both rely heavily on the CDC 
pandemic influenza community and medical response model.  
Both plans apply the Susceptible Infectious Recovered model, or SIR 
model, to projected actions and protocols. The SIR model has been transformed in the 
past fifty years to allow public health agencies to extrapolate various outcomes of 
epidemics based on how populations respond to suggested vaccination and treatment 
regimens (Corburn, Wagner, & Blower, 2009). Critics of most variations of the SIR 
model point out that those projections are usually based upon theoretical behaviors by the 
public.  
Most SIR models for 2009 A/H1N1 were based on assumptions of mass 
vaccination, but in “the ‘real world’ where vaccination is voluntary, high vaccination 
coverage is rarely achieved” (Corburn, Wagner, & Blower, 2009, p. 34). SIR models do 
provide public health agencies with real-world alternatives to unlikely vaccination 
models. Models developed by the WHO and the CDC for 2009 A/H1N1 showed that 
successful vaccination of 80 percent of all persons under the age of 19 years would be as 
successful as vaccinating 80 percent of all people aged one year and over (Corburn, 
Wagner, & Blower, 2009).  
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However, the cross-species transmission of a pandemic virus such as 2009 
A/N1H1 makes modeling efforts relatively futile since cross-species infections and 
transmissions can cause the virus to evolve in ways that allow it to defeat vaccination 
defenses (Corburn, Wagner, & Blower, 2009). The ability of 2009 A/H1N1 to 
recombinate across species effectively eliminates modeling as a realistic means of 
projecting the path of the illness (Corburn, Wagner, & Blower, 2009), but this is never 
discussed in either the Philadelphia or the PTC plans. This is a critical weakness of both 
plans and a weakness of the Tennessee plan as well. 
b. Response Component 
All discussed plans examine allocation and scarcity issues in a vacuum. 
The designation of scarcity may shift as the nature of the virus shifts due to cross-species 
contamination. A vaccine designed for the pandemic influenza may become useless if a 
cross-species contamination and recontamination occurs. The previously vaccinated 
population may require new vaccinations: if this is the case, how will providers know 
whether previously vaccinated individuals now require a second vaccine in a way that is 
more urgent than populations that received no vaccine at all? Public health agencies are 
reluctant to admit that scientific modeling supporting the use of vaccination is relatively 
useless in actually projecting the benefits of vaccination against a virus such as 2009 
A/N1H1 (Corburn, Wagner, & Blower, 2009). This is a mistake. 
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c. Secondary Questions 
Table 7.   Tacoma/Pierce County Components and Review Elements 
 
6. California 
a. Guiding Principle 
California’s Department of Public Health issued its “Standards and 
Guidelines for Healthcare Surge During Emergencies” in late 2007. The plan is a series 
of written protocols to be used as tools for preparing for staffing shortages in medical-
surge emergencies. There is no discussion of allocation of scarce resources other than two 
brief mentions regarding triage strategies and the allocation of “supplies, 
pharmaceuticals, and equipment” during surges (California Department of Public Health, 
2008, pp. 113, 136). No ethical framework is offered, and no justification is offered other 
than two sentences justifying careful allocation of equipment and pharmaceuticals as a 
“stabilizing” method and the careful allocation of triage resources as a means of ensuring 
that such action “saves the largest number of lives in contrast to saving the individual” 
(p. 113). 
The issue of how to obtain the greatest collective saving of lives is left to 
the reader’s imagination. The presumption is that the tool guides found in the plan will 
allow physicians, nurses, hospital administrators, emergency medical technicians, 
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operators of home healthcare services and operators of live-in elderly and special-needs 
patients to come to the right decision. Even as the plan avoids the boilerplate of the 
Philadelphia and TPC plans, there are no templates for actually determining how to alter 
standards of care and allocate scarce resources and no suggestion on how the level of 
medical surge might require adjustments to the way in which scarce resources are 
allocated. 
The Philadelphia, TPC, and Tennessee plans all include brief discussions 
of how and when to identify “too sick patients” and how to generate a hierarchy of need 
through a utilitarian perspective. California’s plan omits all discussion of these issues and 
fails to even suggest that the target audience will be responsible for exercising judgment 
in these matters. The plan does describe the concept of reverse triage in greater detail 
than the first three plans and provides a very brief legal and ethical defense of the practice 
that illustrates the utilitarian premise of most response plans. The plan warns that 
traditional triage perspectives must be avoided. The most severely injured are no longer 
considered priorities unless they have a high likelihood of survival. Those with less 
severe injuries are treated first if treatment is the tipping point for survival. 
The California plan falls into the same ethical trap that Tennessee, TPC, 
and Philadelphia create in failing to list actual categories and classes of those too injured 
to be considered candidates for treatment: it places the full responsibility for these 
decisions on the individual physicians, nurses, and emergency care providers who are 
treating patients. This creates an ad hoc screening method that is neither uniform nor 
objective; rather, it is based on the perspectives of each individual working the triage 
station. 
b. Response Component 
The variation of personal views regarding the viability point of life, the 
sacredness of life, and the moral and ethical obligations of physicians, nurses, and 
healthcare providers to preserve life is dismissed with the use of the simple phrase “the 
greatest good for the greatest number of people.” The plan, like those from Philadelphia,  
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TPC, and Tennessee, does not mention the variation of views regarding the sacredness of 
life or the possibility that a utilitarian approach might well conflict with the moral, 
religious, and ethical beliefs and practices of healthcare personnel.  
There is an unspoken assumption that all healthcare personnel in an 
emergency or crisis situation will essentially share the utilitarian perspective of each plan. 
Philadelphia and TPC plans casually declare that any newborn or infant with a genetic 
disorder that is likely to be fatal before the age of two should be treated in the same way 
as an adult who requests a “do not resuscitate” (DNR) order. There is no discussion 
regarding how different individuals will be able to comply with this directive. There are 
no plans or templates for holding discussions with all healthcare personnel as part of the 
preparedness stage of crisis management or medical surge management. There is only an 
assumption that during a moment of crisis all personnel will know what to do and will do 
it in the most ethical and moral way possible. 
The California plan includes worksheets for more than twenty-nine 
functions and processes to prepare and engage a medical event triggering a surge in care 
needs. The plan expends fewer than 53 words on how to prepare staff for the utilitarian 
decision-making process that could haunt them for the rest of their personal and 
professional lives. This approach might well work in a military situation where chain-of-
command is sufficient to ensure that all personnel follow the orders of those above them. 
But even this assumption is questionable, given the broad religious beliefs held by 
members of the military regarding the sanctity and value of individual life. 
The California plan fails to guide healthcare workers in how to craft a 
hierarchy of care for various health-surge situations. It also fails to define moments when 
existing plans and guides must be changed to fit realistic real-world needs. The legal 
implications of the surge policy are not discussed at all. This may be due to the plan’s 
absence of any real discussion regarding how to accomplish the utilitarian goals in a 
variety of situations. 
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c. Secondary Questions 
Table 8.   California Components and Review Elements 
 
7. Colorado 
a. Guiding Principle 
Colorado’s August 2009 “Influenza Planning Guidelines for Hospitals” 
was published as the 2009 A/H1N1 pandemic was already showing itself to be much less 
of a national health threat than first predicted. The guidelines do not address a WMD 
event or other mass-casualty event and are limited to hospital operations. There is no 
discussion of private medical practices and the public health infrastructure that may well 
be affected by the increase in infected persons with non-life-threatening symptoms who 
use the healthcare system, including emergency rooms at hospitals, rather than the less 
immediate alternatives of family physicians and nurse practitioners. 
The Colorado plan also relies on a utilitarian approach to allocation of 
scare human, equipment, and medicine resources during the highest level of crisis. Unlike 
all previous plans discussed, the Colorado plan strongly urges hospitals to prepare staff 
for harsh utilitarian decision making and to identify and resolve personal ethical and 
religious beliefs among the staff that might interfere with the mission of serving the 
greatest good through helping the greatest number of people. 
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Education protocols mandate that hospital staff participate in programs 
that discuss “the challenges a pandemic may present and the ethical difficulties that may 
arise during a pandemic. Staff should be aware of the hospitals [sic] altered standards of 
care and alternate care facility protocols and procedures … if care is different from 
normal care procedures” (Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, 2009, 
p. 14). 
b. Response Component 
In addition to programs that educate staff personnel about the altered 
standards of care and allotment protocols, the need for counseling and psychological 
support for staff is recognized. Counseling should be provided in the training phase as 
well as the implementation phase during a pandemic outbreak “to assist staff” who are 
having a difficult time adjusting to standards that move away from the needs of the 
individual and toward the needs of the collective community (Colorado Department of 
Public Health and Environment, 2009, p. 19). This may be particularly useful for staff 
concerned with pediatric care. The notion that children and infants with a low likelihood 
of survival must be denied treatment or access to critical resources is expected to be 
difficult for staff. 
Elder-care decisions regarding the allotment of resources is presented as 
“possibly” being similar to pediatric issues. Hospitals should have both a pediatric plan 
and an elderly plan prepared for allocation concerns, although the section on elder-care 
issues suggests that shifts in triage and allocation frameworks for the elderly will be less 
difficult to manage than those impacting infants. The plan also suggests that hospitals 
plan for and add additional security staff and security measures for physical plants since 
the allocation of resources may be misunderstood (or possibly fully understood) by the 
public, who will then express their anger through violent action directed against hospital 
property and staff. 
The Colorado plan also addresses legal issues pertaining to worker’s 
benefits, cancellation of vacation time and sick time, suspension of labor contracts and 
collective bargaining agreements, and the process for reciprocal staffing by hospitals on 
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an as-needed basis during a crisis. Cross-training is also encouraged as a proactive and 
presumptive means of dealing with staff shortages. It is also suggested that hospitals 
consider crating a civilian or lay auxiliary corps for ancillary tasks during the crisis that 
can facilitate cross-training for medical staff. 
The Colorado plan takes a different position from the TPC and 
Philadelphia plans regarding the potential for federal assistance. The Colorado plan 
allows for federal assistance even in a worst-case scenario setting and recommends that 
key medical supplies and resources be inventoried to ensure an uninterrupted supply 
(albeit an insufficient supply) of critical products, equipment, and pharmaceuticals. 
The plan does not deal with any other type of mass-causality event or 
public-health crisis. The plan is clear that, while certain aspects of the plan can be applied 
to non-pandemic influenza situations, there is no attempt to specify which parts apply or 
to suggest the adaptation of influenza strategies to other situations. 
c. Secondary Questions 
Table 9.   Colorado Components and Review Elements 
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8. New York 
a. Guiding Principle 
The draft plan for ventilator distribution and use allotment was written in 
2007. The plan is specific in its intent and does not attempt to extend conclusions and 
protocols to any other area of healthcare resource allocation or to a mass-casualty event. 
The setting for the protocol is an influenza pandemic. There is no literature available 
regarding whether the plan served as a basis for policies of New York hospitals during 
the 2009 A/H1N1 outbreak in the United States. The plan may have not been required 
since the outbreak was far less wide ranging than expected. The CDC estimated that 
approximately 60 million Americans were infected with the virus, approximately 270,000 
were hospitalized, and 12, 270 Americans died from the virus (U.S. Centers for Disease 
Control [CDC], 2010). The number of hospitalizations represents the low range of CDC 
projections (192,000–400,000), and it is doubtful that critical equipment such as 
ventilators were rationed along the lines in the plan. 
b. Response Component 
The plan assigns responsibility for allocation and triage decisions to the 
supervising physician of a hospital. A clear chain of command is established, although 
the supervising physician of each hospital is granted broad authority for developing a 
method for their hospital to follow. Primary-care physicians are expressly excluded from 
participating in triage and allocation frameworks. No reason is provided for this decision. 
Palliative care provisions are emphasized, and palliative care is a key provision for 
patients who are denied ventilators due to reverse triage guidelines. The plan also allows 
for the creation and use of an ad hoc appeals process. The hospital’s ethics committee 
will serve as the ad hoc appeals committee, and hospital ethics committees are 
encouraged to prepare for that role in an influenza crisis. 
A need for constant, clear, and legally sanctioned guidelines is expressed 
in the plan at various points. This emphasis may reflect the composition of the authoring 
committee, which has more attorneys than physicians, nurses, or public health officials. 
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The plan stresses that all hospitals in the state must follow the same protocol, and this 
suggests a concern with litigation claims once the pandemic has subsided. That concern is 
paired with a concern that transparency be evident in each step of the plan and that the 
public be apprised of the plan as it is developed, as it is completed, and at regular 
intervals when public health and hospital officials suggest a pandemic outbreak may 
occur. 
The need for transparency is presented as a critical key to public 
acceptance of the plan. Recommendations include gathering public commentary as a 
genuine way of adapting the plan to conform to public concerns about the reverse triage 
and allocation protocols for pandemic outbreaks. Communication is seen as a critical 
legal step to securing acceptance of the reverse triage for ventilator patients as a standard 
of care in emergency situations. The creation of a standard of care for reverse triage is 
presented as a way to protect physicians and healthcare staff from potential liability from 
the families of those denied ventilators during a crisis (New York Department of Health, 
2007, p. 3). The creation of a professional standard of care, shared with the public in a 
transparent way, will allow hospitals to lobby the state legislature for amendments to 
Good Samaritan laws protecting physicians from decisions made in emergency life-
threatening situations. 
The unspoken message is that reverse triage and denial of treatment 
following a scarcity in ventilators has a greater chance of succeeding if physicians 
making the decision do not have to worry that they may follow in Dr. Anna Pou’s 
footsteps. While standards of practice can, and often do, effectively indemnify decisions 
made by physicians and healthcare providers in immediate life-threatening decisions, the 
only avenue to absolute indemnification is through legislative action. A large portion of 
the plan serves as a validation for the implementation of guidelines as a fixed standard of 
practice. 
The plan relies on protocols and evidence cited by the United States 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) regarding the occurrence of pandemic 
influenza. This information is accompanied by statistics showing the available number of 
ventilators in ICU units in New York hospitals. Projections for ventilators needed to 
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assist influenza patients are created using SIR model calculations. There is some 
discussion regarding the weakness of SIR projections, but the plan makes a strong case 
that any pandemic influenza outbreak approaching the high-middle to high range of 
projected hospitalizations will create a crisis in ventilator access. 
The plan is not a description of necessary allocation strategies as much as 
it is a political document for obtaining legislative consent to new standards of practice for 
public-health crisis situations. The transparency arguments are presented as both the 
ethical responsibility of hospitals to inform the public of serious changes to expected 
medical practices and as a way of having the public support these changes and 
communicate this support to legislators. The language of the document often ventures 
beyond medical and legal frameworks. Projected pandemic influenza viruses “attack” the 
public and the viruses also “attack” children, the elderly, and the helpless. 
The ethical concerns for formulating an alternative care model are 
discussed in detail, and the point is made several times that ethical decision making 
cannot rest solely on technical considerations. A set of guidelines similar to those found 
in the Tennessee plan are set forth: Duty to Care; Duty to Steward Resources; Duty to 
Plan; Distributive Justice; and Transparency. “Distributive Justice” is essentially identical 
to “Respect for Human Dignity,” and “Transparency” is essentially the same as 
“Communication.” “Reciprocity” as expressed in the Tennessee plan has no direct 
counterpart in the New York plan, although the “Duty to Plan” function includes 
arranging for reciprocity contingency plans among local and regional hospitals. 
A somewhat lengthy consideration of what is termed “distributive justice” 
involves the allocation of federal government reserve stockpiles of ventilators. The plan 
argues that distribution of stockpiled ventilators must follow a pattern that mirrors the 
ethnic composition of local and regional districts. The “allocation of ventilators from 
state and federal stockpiles must take into account the ratio of local populations to 
available resources, and supplement those resources accordingly” (New York State 
Department of Health, 2007, p. 16). This creates a dichotomy for reverse triage 
guidelines that must on one hand address the greatest good for the greatest number of  
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people, while on the other hand implementing concerns for ratio of care that mimics the 
ratio of ethnicity in a region. This can be particularly difficult given the predisposition of 
certain types of illness in ethnic populations. 
It is possible, if one assumes a cynical perspective, that this concern 
represents a political effort to please various segments of the state legislature necessary to 
establish reverse triage guidelines as legal standards of care and practice. It is also 
possible that a desire for genuine social justice on the part of the authoring committee 
resulted in an exception to the concept that the needs of the individual must not serve as 
an obstacle to the needs of the community if saving an individual preserves the ethnic 
ratios of a community. It is an issue that is not addressed beyond the cited references, and 
the lack of clarification creates a lacuna that threatens the ethical authenticity of the 
ventilator policy. 
The authenticity of the ventilator policy is its most valuable asset. The 
presumed natural inclination of a medical professional is to save life at all costs except in 
the instance of patient- or legal guardian–directed DNR orders. Extubation of a ventilator 
is a physical process composed of several steps, and each step is the result of deliberation 
preceding the act. The consequences of extubation are perfectly understood by 
physicians, nurses, and other care providers. Extubation undertaken to transfer the 
lifesaving qualities of the equipment to another human being is not an easy task even 
when the moral right is on the side of the person engaging in the extubation. The 
possibility of healthcare personnel refusing to follow established protocols for extubation 
following reverse triage are discussed in the plan. The point is acknowledged that the 
existence of a rule does not in itself guarantee that the rule will be followed. A rule 
requires credibility from those issuing the rule, and credibility is founded in a perception 
of authenticity. 
The final section of the plan creates a method for evaluating which 
patients are treated and which are, in effect, left to their own devices to survive but who 
receive palliative care for pain. The plan of physical classifications subject to some 
physician interpretation and subjective judgment by the presiding physician emerges, one 
that is similar to the Tennessee plan. The precise criteria are not as important as the 
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process for developing the criteria and the criteria’s universal applicability to resolving 
the problem. There is also a presumption that the public’s ultimate acceptance of the 
criteria will be shaped by an emergency situation perceived by the public to be as life 
threatening, as much if not more than a campaign of transparency and healthcare training.  
The plan represents a careful, thorough, and extensive presentation of all 
options related to reverse triage and allocation of scarce resources in a public-health 
crisis. The underlying issues that shape protocols are for the most part dealt with directly, 
and the potential adverse consequences of such policies are planned for in discussions 
regarding how to protect physicians and healthcare workers through the passage of 
standard-of-care legislation. 
c. Secondary Questions 
Table 10.   New York Components and Review Elements 
 
9. Indiana 
a. Guiding Principle 
The justification of Indiana’s plan for dealing solely with pandemic 
influenza borrows liberally from New York’s plan and from general CDC publications 
concerning reverse triage allocation of treatment and resources. The general application 
portion of the plan for ventilator allocation is a verbatim presentation of the New York 
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plan. The Indiana plan requires that all other possibilities for dealing with a patient surge 
be considered before deciding upon reverse triage as the means for determining who 
should be granted access to ventilators and who must be denied, but it provides no 
articulated guidelines for what all possible alternatives. The consideration of various legal 
and ethical issues is discussed using language very similar to that found in the New York 
plan. The triage guidelines specify that “age, social worth, and job function will not affect 
triage allocation decisions” (Indiana Department of Health, 2008, p. 6), although there is 
no discussion regarding how this policy might be carried out, given that age can be a 
significant factor for the elderly and the young in all other plans considered. 
The Indiana plan also discusses the role of ventilators for at-home patients 
and patients residing in private chronic-care facilities. These patients are exempt from 
any triage allocation decisions and are not subject to extubation decisions that are 
followed when evaluating an identical hospital patient receiving ventilation. There is no 
discussion about why two classes of patients are treated differently, and this raises 
questions regarding whether qualities other than age, social worth, and job functions 
determine reverse triage determinations. The category of personal wealth or insured 
status that allows private care either at home or in chronic-care facilities suggests that 
“personal worth” does serve as an exception to a process designed to provide the greatest 
good for the greatest number of people. The exemption of at-home and chronic care 
facility patients ends once a patient is moved to a hospital setting. But the reasons for 
which a patient might be transferred and who might order such a transfer are not 
discussed.  
A critical care triage tool is introduced, and the criterion for exclusion of 
ventilator care is identical to the New York plan. Like the New York plan, clinical-care 
physicians have no authority to exclude treatment. That decision is left to a triage review 
officer, who is described as the supervising physician for a unit. The standards for 
extubation are more articulated than in the New York plan, and specific tools are 
presented for daily evaluation of a patient’s benefits from intubation. When a patient’s 
score fall bellows a certain point, the triage review officer must be consulted for 
extubation consideration. 
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b. Response Component 
The focus of the plan is procedural, and this differs significantly from the 
all-encompassing medical, legal, social, ethical, and political concerns of the New York 
plan. The authoring committee of the Indiana plan has only two attorneys among eight 
physicians, six nurses, and four public-health officials. This may explain the difference in 
the framework’s perspective. The Indiana plans does not extent its findings to any other 
type of mass-casualty event, and no discussion is offered regarding how a pandemic 
shapes response options differently from other public-health challenges caused by natural 
disasters, terrorist incidents, or other medical crises. 
c. Secondary Questions 
Table 11.   Indiana Components and Review Elements 
 
10. Connecticut  
a. Guiding Principle 
The 2009 draft document of the Connecticut Department of Public Health 
was presented to the public in October, and the effects of the 2009 A/H1N1 were well 
known by that time. The general plan is not designed to be implemented for any single  
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specific type of health crisis. It is an all-hazards plan that extends an ethical framework of 
allocation to a variety of circumstances that can affect the nature of resource availability 
and operations requiring allotment based on scarcity. 
b. Response Component 
Like the New York plan, the Connecticut plan seeks to create an altered 
standard of care for disaster medicine that serves to indemnify physicians, nurses, and 
other healthcare personnel from criminal or civilian liability for actions taken during a 
public-health crisis. The diminishing presence of “staff, stuff and space” (Connecticut 
Department of Health, 2010, p. 8) is presented as significantly changing the nature of 
how healthcare can be provided, to whom care should be provided, and the format to 
communicate the changing standards to patients, healthcare personnel, and the public. 
Any altered-standard-of-care plan must provide the framework for doing these things 
without restricting the autonomy of workers to decide how to best adjust to constantly 
and rapidly changing circumstances. 
Connecticut, unlike New York, delineates specific ethical value categories 
that must be addressed to devise reverse triage protocols and to set standards for 
withholding of care. Ten substantive values are listed: Individual Liberty; Protect the 
Public from Harm; Proportionality; Privacy; Duty to Provide Care; Reciprocity; Equity; 
Trust; Solidarity; and Stewardship (Connecticut Department of Health, 2010, pp. 10–14). 
Five procedural values are also listed for how the plan is administered: Reasonable; Open 
and Transparent Communications; Inclusive; Responsive; and Accountable Standards 
(Connecticut Department of Health, 2010, p. 14). The articulation of these values 
conforms to the general concepts found in all other plans, although the detail provided to 
each value results in more confidence that values can actually be effected.  
All altered-standard-of-care protocols must be openly and transparently 
communicated to the public, and public responses must be actively received and 
considered as the plan continues to evolve. Social justice and personal ethics must be 
directed toward the greatest good for the greatest number of people, but as in all other 
plans the means of achieving this lofty goal are never discussed. Reciprocity and 
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stewardship expand from other plans to consider the problems posed to healthcare 
workers who may need to choose between helping family members and helping the 
public (and no resolution of such a dilemma is offered). Reciprocity is also extended to 
the need for a uniform level of care that all hospitals provide all patients. This will avoid 
a loss of public trust in the public-health system, and also buttress altered-standard-of-
care defenses that can be used by healthcare personnel to justify decisions made during a 
crisis. 
c. Secondary Questions 
Table 12.   Connecticut Components and Review Elements 
 
11. Virginia 
a. Guiding Principle 
The state of Virginia Department of Health, in a collaborative effort to 
determining allocation of scarce resources in a variety of medical-disaster situations, 
creates a perspective that is similar to but still different from the perspective found in the 
New York plan. The plan represents a legal perspective that is guided by its authors, 
public-health consultants, physicians, and nurse consultants. The “client” for the plan is 
the state, and all commentaries and advanced plans represent that relationship. 
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The key to a successful strategy of withholding treatment through the use 
of reverse triage methods is the removal of liability claims that can be made against 
healthcare personnel for following such plans. The first page of the plan states:  
Healthcare providers are not accustomed to having to 
allocate inadequate equipment and supplies on the scale 
they will confront in a pandemic. The prospects of 
allocation on this scale, understandably, cause profound 
concern within the Healthcare community because such 
decisions are inextricably tied to liability. These providers 
understand that they have a duty to render care in 
accordance with the applicable standard of care or face 
liability. … Providers in Virginia, both hospitals and 
physicians, expressed concern about this very issue. … 
[T]hese concerns were so strong that, at the extreme, some 
providers were contemplating closing their doors during a 
pandemic instead of providing care under “altered” 
standards unless they had some degree of liability 
protection. (Virginia Department of Health, 2008, p.3) 
b. Response Component 
The thesis of the plan is that execution frameworks are secondary to 
creating a secure environment for healthcare personnel to follow alternative crisis 
treatment regimens. If alternative practices are viewed as imposing significant criminal or 
civil liability risks for engaging in state policy, healthcare personnel will either not show 
up for work, engage in violations of allocation protocols, or perform their work in ways 
that significantly limit their ability to successfully treat the public. The plan suggests that 
the fear of liability originates with a misunderstanding of the legal precedents that protect 
physicians and healthcare workers from engaging in alternative standards of care during a 
public-health disaster or crisis. 
Confusion regarding liability results from the absence of “consistency 
about the exact nature of those standards” to be used to limit allocation of critical 
resources (Virginia Department of Health, 2008, p. 4). The alternative to this situation is 
to employ a process of alternative care that is sufficiently fluid as to allow healthcare 
personnel to adjust the process to real-world challenges during the course of a healthcare 
crisis event. The preplanning process is critical to education and communication of the 
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process to the healthcare community and the public. Preplanning amounts to managing 
the expectations of healthcare personnel and the public regarding what must be done and 
how it will be accomplished. When expectations and concerns are effectively managed, 
the fear and uncertainty are resolved. 
Like the New York and Connecticut plans, the Virginia plan suggests 
legislative action to legally protect healthcare providers. The remainder of the plan 
outlines various ethical values to guide in the creation of equitable and ethical alternative 
models for care. This section draws from sections found in the plans drafted by 
Connecticut and New York. These sections include provisions for identifying the person 
responsible for making reverse triage decisions and the construction of an ad hoc appeals 
process operating through an ad hoc appeals committee. The planning and research 
methods and processes recommended also follow the general guidelines and 
recommendations of the Connecticut and New York plans. 
c. Secondary Questions 
Table 13.   Virginia Components and Review Elements 
 
B. KEY FINDINGS 
The earliest published plans stress the development of guidelines using 
instruments and tools that are believed to bestow legitimacy and equity upon the 
guidelines. The later plans, beginning in late 2007 and in 2008 after a significant federal 
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requirement linked to pandemic planning funds, struggle with additional ethical issues 
pertaining to how allocation plans are presented to two audiences: healthcare personnel 
and the public. Although most plans attempt to achieve social justice and equity for 
patient selection methods, the plans contain often self-contradictory rules regarding how 
protocols are applied to all populations. 
Criminal and civil liability remains a major concern among healthcare providers. 
Although Anna Pou and her legal and civil problems in Louisiana are never mentioned in 
any plan, the underlying causes of Pou’s difficulties are expressed in all documents. It 
may be that liability is a particular worry for American physicians and that this fuels 
concerns with altered standards of care. The absence of altered-standard-of-care protocols 
may also be due to an American political divide on what constitutes the sacredness of 
life. During the debate on President Obama’s healthcare reform plan, many opponents of 
the plan pointed to provisions they claimed created “death squads,” concerned with 
saving costs over saving lives. Given the intense and often highly contentious debates 
over healthcare, the question of liability is a genuine one for physicians and other 
healthcare personnel.  
As the legal aspects of the application of altered standards of care continue to be 
examined, there remains a danger that altered-standard-of-care protocols will emerge that 
are too restrictive. As Justice Stuart Potter of the United States Supreme Court, in ruling 
that obscenity is something that cannot be precisely described, put it, “I know it when I 
see it.” This approach may need to be applied to altered-standard-of-care protocols.  
The use of such an “on the spot” approach is that physicians will not have the 
guaranteed protection they seek. The benefit is that altered-standard-of-care practice will 
actually conform to constantly shifting needs to provide the best care possible to patients 
during a mass casualty, WMD event, or other public-health disaster. Troutman Sanders is 
correct to stress a process over unbreakable protocols. But communicating how this can 




The elephant in the room concerning the management of mass-casualty incidents 
originating from natural disasters, disease outbreak, or terrorist attack is the issue of how 
much authority and latitude needs to be granted to field physicians and healthcare 
personnel facing literal life and death decisions. In traditional military command 
processes the first step begins with the receipt of mission and the mission analysis. Any 
command, whether a traditional “take that hill” or a command to complete a simple 
mundane act, begins with a strong sense of the mission and its limits. Mass-casualty 
incidents run counter to the notion of defining the mission because mass-casualty 
incidents are predominately complicated by nature. Military decision making rests on a 
model designed to accomplish complex tasks. Processes targeting the successful 
completion of complex tasks do not always lend themselves to success in accomplishing 
complicated tasks. 
“Complex” and “complicated” are terms that are often used interchangeably, but 
the processes are entirely different from one another. Complex problems are often 
composed of multiple components requiring careful and attenuated steps to reduce 
components to easily identifiable steps that can then be resolved by direct solutions. 
Complex problems are difficult but ultimately resolvable and are characterized as having 
a finite absolute number of resolutions (Hurlimann, 2009). Complicated problems are 
“characterized by having a multitude of different influencing factors … heavily 
interconnected with one another” (Hurlimann, 2009, p. 14). Complicated problems are 
not static due to the interconnectedness of influencing factors, and as one or more factors 
changes the nature of the interconnected nature of the problem, the potential resolutions 
to the problem also shift and change (Hurlimann, 2009). 
Military decision making rests on the military decision-making process (MDMP) 
formulated in the U.S. Army Leadership Field Manual (USALFM). While the MDMP is 
a fine system for formulating decisions and actions, it “is designed for organizations with 
staff” (U.S. Army, 2004, p. 91). Decisions made in the field rest on the process of troop 
leading procedures (TLP) (U.S. Army, 2004). But neither the TLP nor the MDMP are 
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designed to meet the complicated nature of mass-casualty incidents. The complicated 
nature of mass-casualty incidents makes the design of a plan difficult because there is no 
guaranteed order of needs or absolute circumstances surrounding the problem. 
The USALFM does not contain the word “autonomy.” The USALFM does 
contain the word “independent,” but only once: an “individual leader with initiative is 
willing to decide and initiate independent actions when the concept of operations no 
longer applies or when an unanticipated opportunity leading to accomplishment of the 
commander’s intent presents itself” (U.S. Army, 2004, p. 33). The USALFM states that 
initiative “drives the Army leader to seek a better method … and perform without waiting 
for instructions. … [B]alanced with good judgment, it becomes disciplined initiative, an 
essential leader attribute” (U.S. Army, 2004, p. 33, emphasis in original). 
The military’s solution to solving significantly complicated problems is to 
approach the problem with traditional problem-solving methods and, in the face of field 
events that simply prove too difficult or too unique to be resolved using traditional 
solutions, allow the commander to exercise disciplined initiative. “Disciplined initiative” 
is not defined in precise terms in the USALFM. It is noteworthy that, in the page 
following the use of disciplined initiative, a quote is offered from General Omar Bradley 
regarding judgment: “I learned that good judgment comes from experience and that 
experience grows out of mistakes” (U.S. Army, 2009, p. 34). The commander’s 
experience is presented as a source of impromptu field decisions. But even impromptu 
decisions must be grounded in a framework of battlefield tactics and command 
hierarchies. Disciplined initiative is not an abandonment of military protocol but a key 
part of the military protocol concerned with command decision making. Impromptu 
decision making requires the leader to “juggle hard facts, questionable data, and gut level 
intuition” to arrive at a decision (U.S. Army, 2004, p. 34). The leader must be prepared to 
engage in effective gut level intuition. Preparation will assist the leader in determining 
the best course of action in any given unique situation. 
Gut level intuition requires support in the form of knowledge and thought—
frameworks that will allow the medical leader to make difficult decisions in mass-
casualty incidents. This knowledge set involves intimate familiarity with leadership 
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concepts and practices, legal issues, and operational and supply chain concepts and a 
willingness to exercise disciplined initiative when necessary. 
On July 12–13, 2011, a conference was held in New Orleans to discuss the 
lessons and implications of the events at the Memorial Medical Center during Hurricane 
Katrina. Among the speakers was Dr. Anna Pou, who spoke to a closed session about the 
decision-making process and the need to protect physicians and healthcare workers in 
mass-casualty incidents such as Katrina. Pou distinguished between a Katrina-like natural 
disaster and an outbreak of a disease such as an influenza pandemic. Her principal 
message was the need to grant blanket immunity to any healthcare professional who must 
make hard and often impromptu choices during a mass-casualty incident based on limited 
information and rapidly shifting access to critical supplies (Pou, 2011). Dr. Pou remains 
in civil litigation with families of Memorial Medical Center patients who died, and this 
prevents her from supplying concrete examples drawn from the events at Memorial 
Medical Center. 
In other public venues Dr. Pou has advocated for a special immunity for 
physicians and healthcare personnel working in a mass-casualty incident such as Katrina. 
Her position is that physicians and nurses are the best persons to determine appropriate 
life-saving protocols in a mass-casualty incident such as Katrina. Her views are the 
underlying rationale of legislation passed in Louisiana that expands the concept of the 
Good Samaritan shield offered to physicians to include the withholding of medical care 
and the use of only palliative care when medical resources are severely limited (Fink, 
2009b). 
Pou’s perspective on the withholding of medical care for patients with poor 
prognoses for survival is summed up by her question “How long should healthcare 
workers have to be with patients who may not survive” (Fink, 2009a)? This perspective 
likens healthcare workers to a valuable medicine in short supply and appears to employ a 
utilitarian principle of the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Her answer is 
that physicians and healthcare workers alone should make the determination of what 
constitutes appropriate care without any risk of prosecution other than for willful 
misconduct. She does not provide a definition of what constitutes willful misconduct. 
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This position suggests that physicians and healthcare workers, by virtue of their 
medical education, medical training, and medical experience are best suited to make 
difficult field decisions during a mass-casualty incident. Dr. Pou does not discuss any 
type of special preparation that might be used to better equip professionals with 
knowledge sets to guide emergency field decisions during a mass-casualty incident. The 
presumption is that physicians and healthcare personnel are fit to act without any special 
preparation (Fink, 2009). 
Pou is correct in asserting that physicians and healthcare personnel have no 
available legal or professional standards to fall back on as guides for allocating precious 
medical resources in a time of crisis. Federal regulations do exist that define liability 
issues for physicians in emergency healthcare situations. But none of these regulations 
apply in massive casualty incidents such as those caused by Hurricane Katrina. The 
federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) requires all 
hospitals that accept Medicare and Medicaid patients to screen all emergency room (ER) 
patients to determine whether they require immediate treatment or simply urgent care. If 
a patient requires immediate treatment, the hospital must either treat the patient or 
quickly arrange for transfer of the patient to a facility than can provide immediate care 
(Bailey, 2010). But Dr. Pou was not treating ER patients; she was treating in-patients not 
admitted through the ER (Bailey, 2010). EMTALA creates a two-tier care system that 
can avoid imposing requirements on physicians in a mass-casualty incident. In a mass-
casualty event patients already admitted to hospitals are not protected by EMTALA 
requirements. 
The federal Volunteer Protection Act of 1997 (VPA) extends significant 
immunity to volunteer healthcare personnel and physicians providing treatment for the 
public during an emergency or a health epidemic. The immunity essentially allows 
physicians complete protection from civil liability and criminal liability unless a provider 
can be shown to have acted with malice or engaged in willful misconduct involving 




apply to healthcare personnel who are not volunteers, and any physician or healthcare 
worker receiving remuneration for their services during a mass-casualty event is not 
protected under the VPA. 
Traditional Good Samaritan laws in nearly all fifty states do extend limited 
immunity to physicians and healthcare workers who “in good faith gratuitously rendered 
emergency care or services at the scene of an emergency” or who in good faith responded 
to an imminent life-threatening situation within a hospital or clinic where the worker is 
performing professional duties but would not ordinarily have had to treat the recipient of 
services as part of those duties (Bailey, 2010). But on-duty staff treating patients as part 
of their professional responsibilities are not protected under any Good Samaritan laws. 
The United States Centers for Disease Control (CDC) recognized the lacunae of 
protection for physicians and healthcare workers when it introduced its Model State 
Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA) in December 2001 (Bailey, 2010). 
The Louisiana legislature used the MSEHPA guidelines to enact its own 
emergency healthcare act in 2003. Louisiana’s law, passed in part as a response to what 
occurred at Memorial Medical Center, states that “during a state of public health 
emergency, any health care provider shall not be civilly liable for causing the death or 
injury, to any person, except in the event of gross negligence or willful misconduct” 
(Louisiana, 2003). Gross negligence is defined as “the want of even slight care and 
diligence” and as “the want of that diligence which even careless men are accustomed to 
exercise” (Bailey, 2010, p. 728). 
The precise protections offered by laws based on the MSEHPA guidelines remain 
unknown since no physician or healthcare worker has yet claimed any immunity offered 
by the various state laws modeled on MSEHPA. There is a growing consensus, that is 
also challenged by a sizeable number of healthcare ethicists and physician groups 
(Richards, 2011), that the protections offered by emergency healthcare power acts will 
prove to be insufficient to properly define the limits of a physician or healthcare worker’s 
disciplined initiative (Richards, 2011). A Katrina-like disaster may create situations 
involving more sympathetic patients who are permitted to die based on a physician’s gut 
instinct. The deaths at Memorial Medical Center involved the elderly and the infirm who 
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had led relatively long lives. Suppose in the next Katrina-like situation a ward of 
premature infants is allowed to die because a physician determines that most of the 
premature infants have a lower quality of life expectation if they survive than several 
white upper-middle-class businessmen who are vying for the use of respirators? Legal 
protections do not always suffice when public sentiment is aroused (Richards, 2011).  
Legal liability for physicians is segmented into type 1 and type 2 errors. Type 1 
errors include liability due to faulty judgment even when there is no negligence by the 
physician. A physician believes that his or her patient may require hospitalization when 
in fact hospitalization was not required. While hospitalized the patient acquires a serious 
infection and dies. The physician has done nothing to actually cause the infection, but the 
poor judgment that led to hospitalization is a proximate cause of death. Type 2 errors 
involve direct negligence of some sort that causes harm, injury, or death to a patient: a 
drunken surgeon kills a patient, or a physician administers the wrong drug to a patient 
(Richards, 2011). 
Two additional types of physician errors are being recognized, and these two 
types of errors are linked to emergency and mass-casualty incidents. A type 3 error is 
“the unintentional solving of the wrong problem precisely” (lay persons might simply 
label this as a mistake) and a type 4 error is “the intentional error of solving the wrong 
problem” (Richards, 2011). Both types can be applied to a physician choosing to 
withhold medical treatment for a patient. Physicians do not, and should not, operate in a 
vacuum. The current laws governing emergency mass-casualty events are broad and very 
nonspecific regarding how decisions are made, documented, and carried out. This can 
create multiple opportunities for decisions to be challenged in civil and criminal venues. 
Existing laws, even those passed in Louisiana post–Memorial Medical Center, remain 
insufficient to define how physicians can determine who should be treated and who 
should be placed at the end of the line.  
Ethical guidelines for treating patients in emergency situations can provide some 
guidance for physicians and healthcare workers, but ethics do not have the same power 
and force as laws. The ethical debate regarding proper care frameworks in mass-casualty 
events is active and highly productive. Ethical codes do offer some degree of protection  
 71
to physicians since ethical codes represent a standard of practice that courts will consider 
when determining whether an action is reasonable under the law (Richards, 2011; Taylor, 
2011). 
Ethical issues for mass-casualty events must start with the question of whether 
ethics are situational (Taylor, 2011). The existence of laws establishing different 
standards of conduct for physicians and healthcare workers in different situations 
suggests that ethics are situational, at least where medical care is concerned. Ethicists 
suggest that situational ethics incorporate certain absolute ethics as foundations for 
formulating actions (Taylor, 2011). This allows for certain types of situational variations 
that permit, for example, the acceptance of reverse triage practice in mass-casualty 
events. 
But ethical exceptions create a slippery slope for professionals charged with 
protecting the public. If it is appropriate for a physician to withhold care to certain 
patients, is it also ethical for firefighters or police officers to withhold their services or 
protective actions to certain persons and locations during mass-casualty crises (Taylor, 
2011)? Can a police officer choose to summarily execute looters who are believed to be 
infected with pandemic influenza, rather than take them to a holding area where other 
persons can be infected? 
The withholding of care is not the same thing as the balancing of care. The 
American Medical Association (AMA) policy statement E-9.067 recognizes that 
physicians are a limited commodity in an emergency situation. While the number of 
people requiring treatment can rise dramatically in an emergency event, the number of 
physicians available to treat these people remains fixed. Statement E-9.067 calls for 
“balance” in treating victims of an emergency or infectious disease outbreak (Taylor, 
2011; Bailey, 2010). But “balance” remains undefined, and again the initiative of the 
physician is presented as the arbiter of what is best for the general good. 
The American Nursing Association (ANA) requires nurses to care for all patients 
in a “non-discriminatory manner” and labels the nursing profession a “sacred duty” that 
cannot be broken (Taylor, 2011). The ANA code of ethics demands that nurses treat all 
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patients requiring assistance, even if the potential for harm to the nurse is significant. Yet 
the ANA also recognizes that in emergency situations with mass casualties resulting from 
natural disasters, infectious outbreak, or terrorist attacks, “standards must change” to 
accommodate the reality of a fixed number of nurses available to care for an expanding 
population of patients (Veenema and Toke, 2007, p. 72B). 
The ethical debate regarding mass-casualty incidents becomes one of 
utilitarianism versus egalitarianism (Taylor, 2011). Do treatment ethics assume a position 
of offering the greatest good for the greatest number of people (utilitarianism) or do 
ethics require that all patients receive the same quality of treatment (egalitarianism)? The 
most recent reports issued by state health divisions for best efforts during natural 
disasters, pandemics, and terrorist incidents resulting in mass casualties all follow 
utilitarian guidelines. The direction of statutory protections for physicians and healthcare 
workers also appears to follow utilitarian mandates. The general ethical debate now 
appears to be increasingly focused on the individual’s responsibility for following 
utilitarian mandates (Taylor, 2011). 
Stassi (2011) argues for the creation of three distinct ethical frameworks for 
healthcare providers: conventional, contingency, and crisis levels of care. Each level 
allows providers to establish certain parameters of care, based on what is known and 
what resources are presumed to be available to healthcare providers during each type of 
event. It is possible to construct scenarios based on numerous potential events since many 
factors of possible events are known, including infrastructures, vital materials and 
equipment, maximum number of healthcare providers, maximum number of potential 
patients, transport options, and the contingencies created by various types of trigger 
events. 
Stassi (2011) argues that contingency and crisis standards of care must include 
input from the public at large and that this input must be present from the beginning of 
the process. Since altered ethics and practice of care will be used in crisis situations, the 
altered standards must reflect the consent of those who will ultimately be cared for using 
the altered standards. This will go a long way toward legitimizing the altered standards. 
Stassi also suggests that the situational nature of emergency ethics be incorporated on a 
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daily or hourly basis. If altered standards for care result from the contingent 
circumstances of the moment, some mechanism must be placed in effect that can assess 
standards in light of contingent factors as they change. 
This may mean reassessing crisis standards every hour or half hour, particularly if 
the standards of care become more draconian. Individuals must be assigned responsibility 
for reassessing contingent circumstances, and these individuals cannot be the persons 
charged with administrating altered standards. This will result in the creation of a new 
triage model that is tied to the existing contemporaneous situation and subject to 
immediate change as the contingent situation improves or becomes worse. 
Wallace (2011) supports the fluid ethical model suggested by Stassi (2011). The 
design of mass incident treatment models depends on the surge capacity and surge 
capabilities of the local or regional healthcare network. Surge capacity is the ability to 
“care for a markedly increased volume of patients—one that challenges or exceeds 
normal operating capacity.” Surge capability is the “ability to manage patients requiring 
unusual or very specialized medical evaluation and care.”  
Surge planning requires the acceptance that the duration of a surge is unknown 
and can last for weeks or months rather than simply days. It also requires accepting that 
surge patients will be in addition to non-surge-related patients. Babies are born during 
surge events, people get cancer and pneumonia, and this population is as deserving of 
treatment as surge patients. It requires planning to manage as much as is possible to 
manage during a surge incident. 
Ali (2011) notes that different types of mass-casualty events may require different 
standards of care since the characteristics of a surge will vary by the type of initial 
incident. The 2009 H1N1 pandemic created a different surge pattern than the 2001 
anthrax mailing, and both were different from Hurricane Katrina. The infrastructure 
damage during the H1N1 and anthrax incidents was nonexistent, while Hurricane Katrina 
destroyed most infrastructures that could have negated the crises at Memorial Medical 
Center. 
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Different standards of care must be uniform at the local, regional, state, and 
federal levels. Response planning can only be coordinated if all players are following the 
same paradigms. Ali (2011) notes that there is no genuine coordination of ethics and 
triage on any level and that even states supporting situational practice, such as Louisiana, 
simply provide written guidelines and leave individual hospitals, clinics, and healthcare 
personnel to fend for themselves in creating hard guidelines for action. 
The current state of mass-casualty event planning can best be described as a series 
of noncoordinated guidelines that may or may not extend into detailed scenario planning. 
Mass-casualty incident planning is often theoretical rather than practical, and most 
players remain unsure of their legal and ethical options to engage in contingency 
treatment standards during an emergency. The solution advocated by Dr. Pou—that the 
physician in the field should be the arbiter mundi of treatment standards and that 
whatever decisions are made should be absolutely protected by legal immunity—remains 
a solution that is unacceptable to most healthcare personnel. It amounts to extending to 
all physicians in a mass-casualty incident a blank check for behavior that may or may not 
be appropriate. 
The problem is that contingent situations often require contingent decisions made 
in the midst of crisis. It is possible to create numerous contingency plans and to prepare 
medical personnel to utilize the menu of contingency plans as appropriate to each 
circumstance. However, there is also a reason the dictionary contains the words 
“unknown,” “unexpected,” and “surprise.” It is difficult to create oversight that can serve 
as a control mechanism for dangerous or inappropriate decisions and actions in certain 
types of emergency situations. In a pandemic there will remain open lines of 
communication for field personnel to remain in close and immediate contact with 
supervisors. In a Katrina-like situation communication may be highly difficult or 
nonexistent. Each situation can require different frameworks of decision making.  
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D. CONCLUSION 
Providing blanket immunity to physicians and healthcare personnel in the field 
making life and death decisions during a mass-casualty incident is not a prudent solution 
to the problems posed by mass-casualty incidents. Blanket immunity eliminates 
accountability, and accountability must be present in some form, even if it exists as an 
after-the-fact examination of contingent decisions. The MSEHPA guidelines include the 
requirement that healthcare workers and physicians exercise appropriate diligence in 
executing emergency actions. The absence of a universal standard for emergency care in 
mass-casualty incidents significantly reduces the ability to gauge whether a physician in 
the field is exercising appropriate diligence. 
The issue of appropriate standards for behavior in a mass-casualty incident is a 
vastly complicated one. There is no single solution in the traditional sense of the word. 
The intertwined nature of the multiple factors contributing to mass-casualty situations 
precludes the creation of a single specific application of guidelines. What was appropriate 
for Memorial Medical Center during hurricane Katrina might be criminally negligent in a 
pandemic situation or in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. 
Preparedness can only take players so far in preparing them for the many 
contingencies of a real mass-casualty incident. It is possible to create models of available 
critical materials and likely casualty numbers and patterns of growth. It is possible to 
model various contingencies based on infrastructure integrity and communications 
accessibility, but actual disasters have a way of not always adhering to the plans created 
for dealing with them. The ultimate responsibility for actions in the field is with the 
personnel in the field. 
The use of disciplined initiative is the only recourse available to health 
authorities. This places a tremendous responsibility on field personnel, but they are the 
ones dealing with the results of the crisis situation. It is the responsibility of commanders 
to prepare field personnel as much as possible to exercise their duties to care for all 
parties in a crisis. It must also be accepted that certain situations will occur that are not 
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covered by existing plans and that do not allow for field personnel to communicate with 
higher authorities to determine a course of action. This is the type of situation described 
in the USALFM, and the final resolution of the problem remains the choices made by 
personnel in the event. 
The solution to creating standards of care for mass-casualty incidents is to nurture 
field personnel in ways that will allow them to make appropriate decisions as necessary. 
This does not mean providing personnel with blanket immunity and simply advising them 
to do their best in an emergency not applicable to existing plans. It means providing 
personnel with the knowledge sets to allow them to exercise initiative in appropriate 
ways. Planning is the key to supporting independent decision making. The presence of 
extensive contingency plans can act to define the type of situation where disciplined 
initiative must be applied. The threshold for disciplined initiative can be, ironically, a 
situation not covered by a contingency plan. 
Careful planning can mitigate many of the issues that result in the creation of 
crisis situations requiring disciplined initiative. Communication alternatives can result in 
the field staff remaining in constant contact with higher authorities who can advise on 
sanctioned actions in mass-casualty incidents. The creation of transport contingency 
plans and material to prevent a recurrence of the Memorial Medical Center gridlock can 
prevent the type of circumstance that required physicians to engage in extreme reverse 
triage. 
Since each type of crisis situation is unique, a wide array of contingency plans 
must be created to guide field personnel. However, exercises for situations not covered 
by plans must also be a part of the preparedness protocols. Every nuclear reactor in the 
United States is required by federal law to stage simulations of various crisis situations 
annually. There should be a similar mandate for medical personnel. Simulations will 
provide personnel with the opportunity to experience various scenarios that will test and 
shape their real-world decision-making processes. It is true that one can never prepare 
completely for the unknown, but it is possible to prepare somewhat for the unknown. 
Simulations will provide a key set of experiences for personnel to fall back on in a real 
mass-casualty event.  
 77
By preparing field personnel for the possible moment when disciplined initiative 
is required, the commander will have done all that he or she can do to prepare personnel 
to act independently in a crisis situation. The solution, then, is to properly train the right 
people to perform at their best in unexpected situations. Training is primarily composed 
of extensive contingency planning and simulated exercises designed to prepare field 
personnel for unexpected contingencies in a mass-casualty situation. This will establish a 
set of behaviors and actions that form a nexus for a standard of practice for crisis 
situations. It is not perfect, but it is the best approach possible at this time. 
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V. FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS 
A. DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline and endorse explicit altered-standard-of-
care policies that research demonstrates should be used by interdisciplinary agencies to 
develop all-hazards (pandemic, WMD, disaster) mass-casualty response policies that are 
recommended to guide and support decision making during both preparation and 
response at the state, local (EMS, EMA), and facility (hospital) levels. Research indicates 
that by making altered-standard-of-care policies explicit and using them, the result is to 
increase trust and solidarity among all interdisciplinary stakeholders (IOM, 2006).  
To this end, as discussed in the previous chapter, there must be a clear distinction 
between the mechanics of a process and the underlying ethical mandates for designing 
the process in the way it functions. The concerns with equity, social justice, and the 
prevention of criminal and civil liability to healthcare practitioners during a mass-
casualty public-health disaster that experiences a surge of care demands must be applied 
to policies with caution. Too much rigidity will render policies useless when employed 
against a rapidly changing virus or bacteria. Policies that allow too great a degree of 
autonomy for healthcare providers risks eliminate the liability protections extended to 
providers. If providers believe that they are at risk of being retrospectively blamed for 
their individual decisions, they will not follow altered-standard-of-care protocols. 
Subsequently they will not follow the plan and make ineffective decisions, becoming 
subject to liability claims. In designing altered-standard-of-care policies, the unintended 
consequences paradigm must be avoided at all costs. 
In the aftermath of the grand jury investigation of Anna Pou, the issue of altered 
standards of care and the allocation of resources to critical patients during a disaster 
situation where life-saving supplies are insufficient to meet all needs remains 
underresearched. Federal, state, and local specialists in disaster medicine planning appear 
to be either ignoring the issue or acknowledging the issue without providing any 
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trenchant commentary or devising altered-standard-of-care protocols to guide physicians, 
nurses, and other healthcare workers on how to alter standards of care. Policies issued by 
states, counties, and cities largely address the issue with silence, and there is an implicit 
“between the lines” assumption that careful planning and proactive strategies can avoid 
the possibility of any future crises like the one faced by Dr. Pou and nurses Cheri Landry 
and Lori Budo. More recently issued altered-standard-of-care protocols and drafts for 
protocols address the issue of liability more openly; this is a positive shift in guideline 
development. 
The absence of any discussion regarding paradigms for altered standards of care 
and the allocation of scarce life-saving medicines and devices during a Katrina-like 
emergency resulting from natural disasters, pandemic outbreaks, or terrorist attacks 
involving biological or radioactive weapons suggests that the U.S. medical establishment 
is either very certain that actions similar to Pou’s will be either accepted by medical and 
legal communities or that careful planning will eliminate the possibility that altered 
standards of care and supply allocation crises will recur at all. In this sense the medical 
establishment throughout the United States personifies the proverb that “pride goeth 
before destruction and an haughty spirit before a fall” (Proverbs 16:18). Physicians 
regularly warn patients not to ignore symptoms and hope that a problem will simply 
disappear. Yet this is exactly what is being done with regard to altered standards of care 
in a disaster situation. 
Research indicates policies for altered standards of care due to WMD disaster or 
mass-casualty events should be practical and feasible given available resources, 
evidence-based (supported by the best available medical and epidemiological evidence at 
the time), and concordant with federal guidance, insofar as federal guidance is concurrent 
with the best available medical and epidemiological knowledge. The underlying 
assumption of the federal guidance is that the key objectives of a WMD mass-casualty 
response are to minimize mortality, morbidity, and social disruption (Barbera and 
Macintyre, 2002).  
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Changes in the usual standards of the healthcare response will be required to 
achieve the goal of saving the most lives. It will be necessary to alter standards of care in 
order to allocate scarce medical resources in ways that can save as many lives as possible 
(Hawryluck, Lapinsky, and Stewart, 2005).  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, research indicates that there is a need to 
further develop interdisciplinary federal, state, territorial, local, and health-sector agency 
and institution protocols around the same key elements and components to ensure 
coordination, consistency, and implementation of altered standards of care during a 
WMD disaster or mass-casualty event. Based on the analysis of currently available 
federal, state, and local government altered-standard-of-care protocols, there is an urgent 
and clear need for a new single national guidance for altered standards of care that can be 
generalized to include ethically driven triggers, guaranteed minimums of care, and legal 
protection for all crisis events, including mass-casualty WMD events. In the absence of a 
specific national guidance, it is the intent to recommend that interdisciplinary healthcare 
stakeholders follow the general guidance provided in this document until such time as 
specific national guidance is published. 
The term “altered standards of care” is defined as a substantial change in usual 
healthcare operations and the level of care it is possible to deliver, which is made 
necessary by a pervasive (e.g., pandemic influenza) or catastrophic (e.g., WMD, 
earthquake, hurricane) disaster. This change in the level of healthcare delivered is 
justified by specific circumstances and is formally declared by a state government, in 
recognition that crisis operations will be in effect for a sustained period (AHRQ, 2007). 
The formal declaration that altered standards of care are in operation enables specific 
legal/regulatory powers and protections for healthcare providers in the necessary tasks of 
allocating and using scarce medical resources and implementing alternate care facility 
operations. 
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Research indicated that an overarching ethical framework serves as the bedrock 
for public policy. There are many principles that can contribute to an ethical framework 
(Childress et al., 2002). The focus here is on a limited set of essential elements that 
reflect both core substantive ethical values and processes and that can serve as a model or 
a starting point for interdisciplinary deliberations for triggers, guaranteed care minimums, 
and legal protection. 
The overarching ethical goal in developing crisis standard-of-care protocols for 
scarce medical resources is that the protocols be recognized as fair by all affected parties. 
All subsequent ethical considerations reflect an effort to achieve such fairness (University 
of Toronto, 2005). Interdisciplinary policy makers must seek to eliminate ways in which 
irrelevant factors such as class, race, ethnicity, neighborhood, or personal connections 
shift the burden of the WMD or disaster mass-casualty event toward vulnerable groups. 
By the same token, if particular groups receive favorable treatment, for instance in access 
to vaccines, this priority should stem from relevant factors (e.g., greater exposure or 
vulnerability) and should promote important community goals. Interdisciplinary policies 
should reflect awareness of existing disparities in access, take account of the needs of the 
most vulnerable, and support the equitable and just implementation of altered standards 
of care and the distribution of scarce goods and resources. 
The implementation of altered standards of care based on evidence is one way to 
reflect the principle of fairness. Interdisciplinary planning for triggers, guaranteed care 
minimums, and legal protection must include advance ethical guidance (CDC, 2006).  
The primary duty of an interdisciplinary professional is to the victim. This duty 
holds true during a WMD or disaster mass-casualty event, even when providing care 
entails some risk to the professionals (AMA, 2004). In crisis situations professionals 
cannot relinquish their obligations to individuals without sacrificing core professional 
values. Recognizing that altered standards of care and scarce medical resources may 
restrict treatment choices, professionals must not abandon victims, and victims should not 
fear abandonment when an ethical framework informs an altered-standard-of-care policy. 
 83
While professionals have a duty to care for victims, healthcare institutions have a 
reciprocal duty to support workers. Personal protective equipment, engineering controls, 
and a variety of mechanisms to reduce the risk of infection recognize the institutional 
obligation to protect workers who face risks in providing care (AMA, 2004). Various 
types of mass-casualty event disasters might call for other or additional protections to 
safeguard workers who face risks, including mental health risks, as they provide care to 
the community. 
Healthcare institutions, public-safety responders, and public-health officials also 
have a duty to steward alternate care protocols, reflecting the utilitarian goal of saving the 
greatest possible number of lives. Professionals must balance this duty to the community 
against that to the individual victim. As the number of victims increases, accommodating 
the two competing duties of care and stewardship will require more difficult choices. 
There is no uniform answer about how to weigh such competing values. Addressing this 
balancing act under very difficult conditions, with the goal of making decisions that will 
be recognized as fair under the circumstances, makes it critical to establish ethical 
alternate-standard-of-care processes for decision making. 
Interdisciplinary public entities charged with protecting communities during times 
when altered-standard-of-care protocols are in effect have profound responsibilities. They 
must draw on the best available research, collect and develop expert opinion, and draw 
attention to gaps in knowledge and resources needed to implement those protocols and 
protect the community. In addition to sound ethics, altered-standard-of-care policies must 
reflect specific values in choices about contested issues, such as priority setting for access 
to scarce resources and restrictions on individual choice. A public engagement process is 
crucial for drafting altered-standard-of-care policies that reflect the community’s values 
and deserve its trust. The goal of effective community participation in disaster policy 
development and evaluation is insufficiently realized at this time (CDC, 2009). Given 
that any disaster can emerge before the completion of a robust process of public 
engagement, officials must strive to communicate clearly those plans currently in place 
and must also rely on real-time communication with communities and after-the-fact 
review.  
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As evidenced by research, a truly inclusive process will not rely only on input 
from professional groups and other organized stakeholders, but it will also incorporate 
the views of those who are less well represented in the political process but who may be 
greatly affected by altered-standard-of-care policy choices. Enlisting the public to discuss 
a future disaster when current stressors overwhelm many will prove challenging. Values 
that drive altered-standard-of-care policy should be explicitly stated so that communities 
can articulate, examine, affirm or reject, and modify proposed choices. 
Transparency also implies candor in communication about disasters and the 
implementation of alerted standards of care, from clinicians to patients and throughout all 
levels of the healthcare system. Limitation of choice for both patients and providers is a 
reality of a WMD or disaster mass-casualty event and will affect many aspects of 
healthcare delivery. Professionals and victims will have fewer treatment options. 
Evidence-based criteria, rather than victim preference or clinical judgment, will 
determine access to the most limited medical resources. Though victim autonomy is 
reduced by the circumstances of an event, victims still deserve clear information about 
available choices, respect for preferences within resource constraints, and empathic 
acknowledgment of the sometimes dire consequences of resource limitation. 
Consistency in treating like groups alike is one way of promoting fairness. The 
public may find that, due to altered standards of care being implemented, scarce medical 
resources have not been allocated fairly if victims at different hospitals in the same 
affected area receive vastly different levels of care. However, efforts to keep altered-
standard-of-care policies consistent across institutions or geographic regions may limit 
local flexibility in implementing guidance. 
Altered-standard-of-care polices for WMD and disaster mass-casualty events will 
include aspects that are burdensome to individuals and interdisciplinary professionals. 
Burdens such as the allocation of scarce resources, social distancing, school closures, or 
even quarantine should be necessary and commensurate with the scale of the WMD or 
disaster event. Those restrictions imposed must serve important public needs—such as 
the need to limit spread of an infectious agent—and must be appropriately limited in time 
and scale according to the scope and severity of the event.  
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C. CONCLUSION 
Effective interdisciplinary altered-standard-of-care policy planning that includes 
ethically based triggers, guaranteed minimums of care, and legal protection for all mass 
casualty events including WMD and disasters is imperative and will require individuals at 
all levels to accept and act on their appropriate responsibilities. As part of their duties to 
respond and to ethically alter standards of care and steward scarce resources, individual 
professionals are responsible for a good-faith effort toward education of all parties 
concerned with the implementation of altered standards of care during a WMD or disaster 
mass-casualty event. Government entities are accountable to their communities to plan 
and implement altered-standard-of-care policies related to WMD or disaster events, and 
members of the community must know which interdisciplinary entities take responsibility 
for various elements of altered-standard-of-care policies. All decision makers should be 
accountable for a reasonable level of situational awareness and for incorporating 
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